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The New Abortion Battleground
David S. Cohen, Greer Donley & Rachel Rebouché *
123 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2023)
This Article examines the paradigm shift that is occurring now that the
Supreme Court has overturned Roe v. Wade. Returning abortion law to the states
has spawned perplexing legal conflicts across state borders and between states and
the federal government. This article emphasizes how these issues intersect with
innovations in the delivery of abortion, which can now occur entirely online and
transcend state boundaries. The interjurisdictional abortion wars are coming, and
this Article is the first to provide the roadmap for the immediate aftermath of Roe’s
reversal and what lies ahead.
Judges and scholars, and most recently the Supreme Court, have long
claimed that abortion law will become simpler if Roe is overturned, but that is
woefully naïve. In reality, overturning Roe will create a novel world of complex,
interjurisdictional legal conflicts over abortion. Some states will pass laws creating
civil or criminal liability for out-of-state abortion travel while others will pass laws
insulating their providers from out-of-state prosecutions. The federal
government will also stake a claim. Beyond promoting access to medication abortion,
federal regulations may preempt state abortion bans and federal land could provide
shelter for abortion services. Ultimately, once the constitutional protection for previability abortion disappears, the impending battles over abortion access will
transport the half-century war over Roe into a new arena, one that will make
abortion jurisprudence more complex than ever before.
This Article is the first to offer insights into this fast-approaching
transformation of abortion rights, law, and access. It explores the interjurisdictional
issues sure to arise while looking ahead to creative strategies to promote abortion
access in a country without a constitutional abortion right.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision to overturn Roe v. Wade will
usher in a new era of abortion law and access.1 Borders and jurisdiction
will become the central focus of the abortion battle. What had been,
until now, a uniform national right2 has become a state-by-state
patchwork. In a post-Roe country, states will attempt to impose their
local abortion policies as widely as possible, even across state lines, and
will battle one another over these choices; at the same time, the federal
government may intervene to thwart state attempts to control abortion
law. In other words, the interjurisdictional abortion wars are coming.
This Article is the first to offer insights into this fast-approaching
transformation of abortion rights, law, and access.
Though access to abortion was already scarce in many regions,
for the past fifty years, the Supreme Court had held steadfast to the
principle that the Constitution protected the right to pre-viability
abortion everywhere in the country. The Court upended that
longstanding precedent in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization,
holding that the U.S. Constitution lacks any abortion right.3 By the time
of this publication, 17 states—mostly in the South and Midwest—have
banned or tried to ban abortion in almost all circumstances, while
another 3 states are expected to have bans in the near future.4 The
remaining states—mostly along the coasts—continue to offer legal
abortion, regulated to varying degrees, with some states codifying
abortion rights and expanding access.5

In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that criminal laws banning abortion were
an infringement of a constitutional right to privacy. 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). In
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court preserved constitutional protection for
abortion, but gave states greater discretion to restrict access to abortion. 505 U.S.
833, 873 (1992). One of Casey’s central holdings is that a state cannot ban previability abortions Id. at 872. On June 24, 2022, the Court overturned both of these
precedents. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, No. 19-1392 (June
24, 2022).
2 It is important to contrast what had been a national right to the national reality of
access, which has always been marked by significant race and class disparities. See
DAVID S. COHEN & CAROLE JOFFE, OBSTACLE COURSE, THE EVERYDAY
STRUGGLE TO GET AN ABORTION IN AMERICA (2020).
3 The Supreme Court ruled that neither the history and tradition of abortion
regulation nor the text of the Constitution supports the “egregiously wrong”
judgment in Roe and reiterated in Casey that the Fourteenth Amendment protects
previable abortion decisions. States are free to regulate, even ban, abortion so long
as there is “a rational basis on which the legislature could have thought that it
would serve legitimate state interests.” Dobbs, slip op. at 77.
4 Caroline Kitchener, Kevin Schaul, N. Kirkpatrick, Daniela Santamariña and
Lauren Tierney, Abortion Is Now Banned In These States. See Where Laws Have Changed,
WASH. POST (last updated July 22, 2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/06/24/abortion-state-lawscriminalization-roe/.
5 Abortion Policy in the Absence of Roe, GUTTMACHER INST.,
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/abortion-policy-absence-roe.
1
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Antiabortion jurists and advocates have long forecasted that
abortion law will become simpler if Roe is overturned. This claim has
been a central part of their efforts to overturn Roe and Planned
Parenthood v. Casey—the case that upheld Roe’s protection of previability abortion—which created an unworkably complex legal
framework, according to this argument. In Casey, for instance, Justice
Scalia wrote in dissent that the undue burden test, which supplanted
the trimester framework announced in Roe, was “inherently
manipulable and will prove hopelessly unworkable in practice.”6
Abortion law will become simpler, the argument continues, because
states will be able to craft laws without the threat of constitutional
litigation. Justice Scalia went so far as to suggest that overturning Roe
and Casey will remove the Court from the “abortion-umpiring
business” because doing so would “return this matter to the people”
to determine “State by State, whether this practice should be allowed.”7
Justice Alito adopted this argument in the Dobbs opinion, noting that
Casey saddled judges with “an unwieldy and inappropriate task.”8
As this Article makes clear, the opposite is true: overturning
Roe and Casey will create a complicated world of novel
interjurisdictional legal conflicts over abortion. Instead of creating
stability and certainty, it will lead to profound confusion because
advocates on both sides of the abortion controversy will not stop at
state borders in their efforts to apply their policies as broadly as
possible. Antiabortion activists have made clear that overturning Roe is
the first step toward their goal of making abortion illegal nationwide.9
Right now, there are not enough votes in Congress nor is there a
supportive White House to achieve that goal. That will leave the effort
to antiabortion states who will, with Roe overturned, not only pass laws
that criminalize in-state abortion, but also attempt to impose civil or
criminal liability for those who travel out of state for abortion care or
those who provide that care for their citizens or help them get it.10 In
a post-Roe country, abortion-supportive states will seek the opposite
and, in an effort to expand abortion access as broadly as possible, pass
laws that protect their providers from legal sanctions after helping outof-state residents obtain care.11

Casey, 505 U.S. at 986 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
8 Slip op. at 62; see also id. at 56-62.
9 Caroline Kitchener, The Next Frontier of the Antiabortion Movement: A Nationwide
Abortion Ban, WASH. POST (May 2, 2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2022/05/02/abortion-ban-roesupreme-court-mississippi/; Caroline Kitchener, Roe’s Gone. Now antiabortion
lawmakers want more, WASH. POST (June 25, 2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/06/25/roe-antiabortionlawmakers-restrictions-state-legislatures/.
10 See infra Part II.A, B.
11 See infra Part II.D.
6
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We have already seen the beginnings of these battles. A model
law authored by the National Right to Life Committee bans assisting a
minor across state lines to get an abortion, “[r]egardless of where [the]
illegal abortion occurs.”12 Multiple so-called “sanctuary cities” in Texas
have likewise included such language, banning abortion for city
residents “regardless of where the abortion is or will be performed.”13
Missouri has now twice considered passing a statewide law to this
effect: with a 2021 bill that would have applied the state’s abortion
restrictions to out-of-state abortions performed on Missouri citizens,14
and a 2022 bill that imposed civil liability on those helping Missouri
citizens travel out of state to obtain an abortion.15 From the abortionsupportive side of the ledger, a Connecticut law adopted in April 2022
became the first in the nation to offer protection for those who
provide and assist in the provision of abortions to out of state patients,
and four other states have since followed suit. In the wake of Dobbs,
ten governors from abortion-supportive states have issued executive
orders indicating they will not extradite abortion providers and limiting
state employees from participating in out of state investigations of
abortions legally occurring within those states. These examples are the
first of many to come.16
Roe’s demise is just one part of the story behind the seismic
shift in abortion law; the other is that abortion practice has changed in
ways that make borders less relevant. The rise of telehealth for
medication abortion—abortion completed solely with medication
during the first ten weeks of pregnancy—allows abortion provision to
occur across state and country lines.17 Virtual clinics, offering remote
medication abortion through telehealth, have begun to operate in
greater numbers, and brick-and-mortar clinics have expanded their
practice into virtual care as well. Early abortion care has, as a result,

National Right to Life Committee, Model Abortion Law,
https://www.nrlc.org/wp-content/uploads/NRLC-Post-Roe-Model-AbortionLaw-FINAL-1.pdf
13 Cisco Ordinance Outlawing Abortion, Aug. 19, 2021,
https://www.scribd.com/document/567480915/Cisco-Ordinance-OutlawingAbortion-08-19-21-Docx-1; Slaton, Texas Ordinance Outlawing Abortion Within
the City Limits, July 8, 2021,
https://www.scribd.com/document/569256021/Slaton-Texas-OrdinanceOutlawing-Abortion-Within-the-City-Limits-07-08-2021-Docx-1.
14 S.B. 603, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2021).
15 HB 2012, 102nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2022).
16 See infra Part II.D.
17 The pandemic catapulted the idea of virtual abortion care from a distant dream
to a new reality, revolutionizing how abortion care is offered. Rachel Rebouché,
Greer Donley & David Cohen, The FDA's Telehealth Safety Net for Abortion Only
Stretches So Far, The HILL (Dec. 18, 2021),
https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/586329-the-fdas-telehealth-safety-net-forabortion-only-stretches-so-far.
12
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become more portable in the states that permit telehealth for
abortion.18
The portability of medication abortion will impact abortion
access even in states that prohibit telehealth or ban abortion after Roe.
In those jurisdictions, people19 already obtain this medication through
the mail, often with the help of an international organization.20 Even
for patients who travel to abortion supportive states to obtain
medication abortion legally, if they consume one or both sets of
medications in the antiabortion state, it raises novel questions about
where an abortion occurred. Out-of-state and out-of-country
providers could be guilty of state crimes if they knowingly send pills
into antiabortion states; but antiabortion states will struggle to establish
jurisdiction over these providers, while abortion-protective states will
attempt to protect their providers from out-of-state prosecutions. The
legal uncertainty in this newly developing world of remote abortion
will shape the actions of patients, providers, and the networks that
support them in the years to come.
Additional interjurisdictional conflicts will also arise because
the federal government could play a more pronounced role in abortion
regulation, whether deploying strategies to protect or limit abortion
nationally. Whatever the political agenda, federal action in this area
could create jurisdictional conflict with state regulation of abortion.
The Biden Administration has already taken some executive action in
the immediate aftermath of Dobbs, and members of Congress have
advocated for more aggressive ideas.21
This Article tackles these tricky interjurisdictional issues while
considering strategies to protect abortion access in a country without
a constitutional right to abortion. Part I starts by describing what a
post-Roe country looks like when each state is free to ban abortion at
any point in pregnancy. It highlights both the legal heterogeneity across
Medication Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/statepolicy/explore/medication-abortion.
19 Not every person capable of becoming pregnant is a woman; trans men and
gender non-binary patients also need access to abortion and reproductive
healthcare. There are also times, however, where gender’s intersection with
abortion is important and relevant. We do our best to thread that needle by using a
variety of terms in our discussion. For more context, see Jessica Clarke, They, Them,
and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894 (2019); LORETTA ROSS & RICKIE SOLINGER,
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION 6-8 (1st ed. 2017).
20 See infra Part I.B.
21 The White House, Fact Sheet: President Biden to Sign Executive Order Protecting Access
to Reproductive Health Care Services (July 8, 2022),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2022/07/08/fact-sheet-president-biden-to-sign-executive-orderprotecting-access-to-reproductive-health-care-services/; Letter from Senator
Elizabeth Warren to President Joseph Biden, June 27, 2022,
https://www.warren.senate.gov/download/20220607-letter-to-potus-on-abortioneo.
18
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states and notes how the law will alter the practice of abortion on the
ground, paying attention to the growth of self-managed abortion and
remote abortion access across state and country lines.
Next, Part II focuses on the next generation of interstate
abortion conflicts. It first explores the legal complexity that will result
when antiabortion states attempt to punish extraterritorial abortion
through general criminal laws, like conspiracy, or laws specifically
targeting abortion providers, helpers, and even patients. The
Constitution’s general prohibition of state restrictions on interstate
travel, burdens on interstate commerce, or application of a state’s law
outside its borders should make it difficult for antiabortion states to
enforce these laws. Yet, these constitutional defenses are
underdeveloped and subject to debate, leaving courts as the ultimate
arbiters of these interjurisdictional battles. It then explores how states
in which abortion remains legal might prevent antiabortion states from
enforcing their laws in other jurisdictions. These dueling strategies,
however, come at a cost by undermining key tenets of federalism and
comity.
Finally, Part III highlights how the federal government, given
the current Administration’s commitments to reproductive rights,
might protect abortion access in states that ban it. It argues that the
supremacy of federal law provides a novel and untested argument for
chipping away at state abortion bans. The FDA’s exercise of authority
over medication abortion since it was approved in 2000 suggests that
FDA regulation preempts contradictory state laws, potentially granting
a right to medication abortion in all fifty states. Other federal laws
governing health privacy and emergency medical treatment could also
poke additional holes in state abortion bans. Moreover, because state
law does not always apply on federal land, some abortions provided on
leased federal land within antiabortion states might not be subject to
state abortion bans. Federal policy decisions could also promote access
to medication abortion through telehealth and multi-state physician
licensing.
Ultimately, without a constitutional right to abortion, the
coming battles over abortion access will move the half-century war
over Roe into a new interjurisdictional arena. These conflicts will make
abortion jurisprudence much more complex than before, in ways that
test the principles underpinning our federalist system of government.
But these conflicts also open the door to unexamined possibilities in a
new era of abortion access—a future that will no longer be tethered to
constitutional rights. This Article concludes by highlighting how an
abortion rights movement might pivot from defense to offense, from
short game to long game, and capitalize on the same strategies that led
to the antiabortion movement’s success.

5
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I.

POST-ROE ABORTION RIGHTS AND ACCESS

Among the various arguments to overturn Roe, conservatives
have long argued that Roe and its progeny created unworkable
standards that have vexed lower courts. Their list of concerns includes
that the undue burden standard—Casey’s constitutional test for vetting
state abortion restrictions—is vague and difficult to apply,22 that
viability23 is a moving target, and that a health-or-life exception24 is
malleable.25 Abortion precedents should be overturned, in this vein of
thinking, because the values underlying stare decisis fail in the face of
unworkability.26 The simpler, more workable alternative, they claim,
would be to allow each state to decide its own abortion laws. Justice
Alito adopted this reasoning in full in Dobbs.27 But he and those who
came before him are wrong.
In this section, we explore a United States without any
constitutional floor for abortion rights. Though states have restricted
abortion to varying degrees, straining abortion access and making
services all but absent in a few places, Roe v. Wade, as interpreted by
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, established that no state may ban previability abortion.28 Without Roe, that has changed. The legality of
obtaining any abortion care now hinges on where you live.
The heterogeneity that characterized abortion regulation for
the past half century will be nothing like the complexity of what is
unfolding now and what is to come. This part outlines the myriad ways
in which states will ban (or protect) in-state and cross-border services
with Roe now overturned. We then explore how the now-varying
legality of abortion will affect access to abortion. Such access
comprises both traditional in-person services, accessed through
interstate travel, and remote services. We argue that due to innovations
in abortion care, abortion access will not necessarily be tied to local
abortion legality: people can and already do obtain abortion inducing
drugs online and will continue to do so through telemedicine or other
means. Thus, post-Roe America looks very different than much of the
Roe and pre-Roe era.
Casey held that states can regulate pre-viability abortions so long as the regulation
did not create an undue burden. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874. Courts apply this standard
differently.
23 The Court has determined that viability starts when a fetus has “realistic
possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb.” Id. at 870. This
point has changed over time.
24 The Court has always required that abortion bans include an exception for the
life or health of the mother, unless the court determines that the law does not harm
the health or life of the mother. See id. at 846.
25 Mary Ziegler, Taming Unworkability Doctrine: Rethinking Stare Decisis, 50 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1215, 1218-39 (2018).
26 Id. at 1218.
27 Dobbs, slip op. at 56-62.
28 Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
22
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A. The Post-Roe Interjurisdictional Legal Landscape and its Impact
on Abortion-Related Travel
Without Roe, roughly half the country is expected to make
almost all abortion services illegal.29 At the time of writing, 17 states
have done just that, with three more coming soon.30 Overturning Roe
will not only result in states criminalizing abortion; according to the
Dobbs majority, states can decree that life begins at conception, which
could treat abortion as murder. Georgia, Arizona, and Alabama already
have such a law in place (enjoined while Roe and Casey stood31), and the
Louisiana legislature considered, but ultimately shelved, such a bill in
May 2022.32
Abortion-supportive states will comprise the other half of the
country post-Roe. At present, sixteen states and the District of
Columbia have passed laws to protect abortion rights on their own
regardless of a federal constitutional right.33 These state laws guarantee
mostly unencumbered access to pre-viability abortion and access to
post-viability abortion when necessary to protect the health or life of
the pregnant person.34 The remaining states will operate in a middle
ground, keeping abortion legal, but regulating it to varying degrees of
strictness.35 Providers in all of the states where abortion remains legal
will begin providing services to those traveling from states where
abortion is banned, putting immense strain on their capacity to deliver
services.36
The effects of this new reality will have devastating
consequences for all abortion seekers. A 2019 study mapped what
abortion provision would look like if Roe were overturned.37 It found
that “the average resident is expected to experience a 249-mile increase
Abortion Policy in the Absence of Roe, supra note 5.
Kitchner et al., supra note X.
31 Ala. Code § 26-23H-1 to -8 (enjoined by Robinson v. Marshall, 415 F. Supp. 3d
1053 (M.D. Ala. 2019)).
32 Rick Rojas & Tariro Mzezewa, After Tense Debate, Louisiana Scraps Plan to Classify
Abortion as Homicide, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/12/us/louisiana-abortion-bill.html.
33Abortion Policy in the Absence of Roe, supra note 5.
34 Two states and the District of Columbia have codified the right to abortion
throughout pregnancy without state interference. Id.
35 Id.
36 See Rachel Jones et al., New Evidence: Texas Residents Have Obtained Abortions in at
Least 12 States That Do Not Border Texas, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 9, 2021),
https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2021/11/new-evidence-texas-residents-haveobtained-abortions-least-12-states-do-not-border; Mary Tuma, Texas’ Abortion Ban
is Having a ‘Domino Effect’ on Clinics across the U.S., TEX. OBSERVER (Nov. 18, 2021),
https://www.texasobserver.org/texas-abortion-ban-is-having-a-domino-effect-onclinics-across-the-u-s/.
37 Caitlin Myers et al., Predicted Changes in Abortion Access and Incidence in a Post-Roe
World, 100 CONTRACEPTION 367, 369 (2019).
29
30

7

DRAFT 8/4/22
IF QUOTING, PLEASE INDICATE THIS IS A DRAFT

in travel distance, and the abortion rate is predicted to fall by 32.8%.”38
Indeed, regional gaps in abortion access are already stark. Leading up
to Dobbs, six states had only one abortion clinic,39 and providers
throughout the country were increasingly concentrated in urban areas,
creating “abortion deserts,” mostly in the Midwest and South, in which
there were no providers within one hundred miles of many of a state’s
residents.40 Now that states can ban almost all abortions at any point
in pregnancy, the size of the already-existing abortion deserts will
balloon.
The impact of these abortion deserts is stark. Three quarters
of abortion patients are poor or low income,41 and the costs associated
with travel, time off work, and childcare already had significant impacts
on their ability to obtain abortion care in the Roe-era.42 With the costs
of travel increasing as distances double, triple, or quadruple, and
corresponding logistical burdens growing, many abortion seekers will
not be able to afford the costs. Abortion funds seek to help these
patients, but it is unclear if they can help on the scale necessary,
especially as states like Texas work to shut them down.43 Without
funding, poor women and women of color, who comprise over half of
people seeking abortion care, are more likely to be left with the options
of continuing an unwanted pregnancy or self-managing an abortion in
a hostile state with the corresponding legal risks (discussed in the
section below). Moreover, there are some people who will struggle to
leave the state for other reasons—those who are institutionalized or
hospitalized, those on parole, those who are undocumented, and those

Id. at 367.
COMMUNITIES NEED CLINICS REPORT 2021, ABORTION CARE NETWORK, 5
(2021), https://abortioncarenetwork.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/11/CommunitiesNeedClinics2021-1.pdf.
40 See Lisa R. Pruitt & Marta R. Vanegas, Urbanormativity, Spatial Privilege, and Judicial
Blind Spots in Abortion Law, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 76, 79−80 (2015)
(discussing the unique impacts antiabortion laws have on women living in rural
areas).
41 Abortion Patients are Disproportionately Poor and Low Income, GUTTMACHER INST.
(May 19, 2016), https://www.guttmacher.org/infographic/2016/abortion-patientsare-disproportionately-poor-and-low-income.
42 Ushma D. Upadhyay, Tracy A. Weitz, Rachel K. Jones, Rana E. Barar & Diana
Greene Foster, Denial of Abortion Because of Provider Gestational Age Limits in the United
States, 104 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1687, 1689-91 (2014); Jenna Jerman, Lori
Frohwirth, Meghan L. Kavanaugh, Nakeisha Blades, Barriers to Abortion Care and
Their Consequences For Patients Traveling for Services: Qualitative Findings from Two States,
49 PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 95 (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1363/psrh.12024.
43 See Jolie Mccullough & Neelam Bohra, As Texans Fill Up Abortion Clinics In Other
States, Low-Income People Get Left Behind, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE (Sept. 3, 2021),
https://www.texastribune.org/2021/09/02/texas-abortion-out-of-state-people-ofcolor/.
38
39
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with disabilities that makes travel challenging.44 As countless news
stories have highlighted, many pregnant people with medical
emergencies may also be denied an abortion, and they, too, may be
unable to travel.45
Moreover, the clinics that remain open will be inundated with
out-of-state patients, delaying care for in and out-of-state patients
alike.46 Already, clinics in certain areas are booking over three weeks
out or not scheduling new patients due to the surge in demand.47
California abortion providers already served about 7,000 patients per
year from other states; with Roe overturned, one study estimates that
an additional 8,000-16,000 people will be traveling to the state for
care.48 A coalition of California officials and medical care professionals
is scaling up efforts to provide financial and logistical support to
abortion travelers, but it is unclear if these efforts can meet the needs
of out-of-state patients.49
Abortion travel will become an essential part of the post-Roe
reality, but there will be attempts to outlaw it. Some state legislators are
now focused on both regulating abortion outside their borders and
stopping their citizens from traveling for abortion care. Abortionsupportive states likewise have already begun to craft legislation in
anticipation of increased demand for services and the need to protect
providers who offer care to patients who live out of state. Part II
describes these laws in more detail as well as options for states looking
to enact even more comprehensive abortion provider protections.50
Though the focus in the coming years will be on state efforts
to outlaw or to protect abortion access, the federal government will
See Robyn Powell, Disability Reproductive Justice, forthcoming in the Penn. L.
Rev.; see also Cohen & Joffe, supra note ??, at 72-83 (describing the pre-Roe challenge
of getting to a clinic).
45 See Jack Healy, With Roe Set to End, Many Women Worry About High-Risk Pregnancies,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/20/us/abortionhigh-risk-pregnancy.html.
46 Margot Sanger-Katz, Claire Cain Miller & Josh Katz, Interstate Abortion Travel Is
Already Straining Parts of the System, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/23/upshot/abortion-interstate-travelappointments.html?referringSource=articleShare.
47 Id.
48Brad Sears, Cathren Cohen, Lara Stemple, People Traveling to California and Los
Angeles for Abortion Care if Roe v. Wade is Overturned (June 2022),
https://law.ucla.edu/sites/default/files/PDFs/Center_on_Reproductive_Health/
California_Abortion_Estimates.pdf.
49 Id.
50 This article has played an interesting role in the passage of these laws. Before its
appearance online in draft form, we advised legislators in Connecticut about
options for protecting abortion providers. They took many of our ideas and
molded them into a bill, that we advised on and testified in support of. This bill
ultimately passed. Legislators in New York did not contact us, but several of the
narratives supporting their proposed bills lifted language almost directly from our
draft article.
44
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also enter the fray in this new landscape. The Biden Administration
has preliminarily indicated that it wants to protect interstate travel and
access to medication abortion in the aftermath of Dobbs, and multiple
members of Congress have encouraged President Biden to explore
leasing federal land to abortion providers.51 Part III discusses the legal
complexities of these actions.
B. Beyond Legality: Avenues for Accessing Abortion After Dobbs
Abortion becoming illegal in half of the country will be
devastating for people seeking abortion generally and, as we note
above, disproportionally so for poor people and women of color.52 But
legal scholarship has not yet explored or developed how abortion care
will be different in a post-Roe world, compared to a pre-Roe world.53
The country’s pre-Roe history coupled with the comparative experience
of other countries points to one thing, however: abortions will not stop
occurring just because they are illegal.54
One important difference between illegal abortion in the future
and illegal abortion decades ago is that people will be able to safely
terminate a pregnancy without leaving their homes. To be sure,
abortion travel will always be a necessary and significant part of
abortion care post-Roe, but with the uptake of mailed medication
abortion, it will not be the only way to find a safe and effective
abortion.
In 2000, the FDA paved the way for abortion done solely with
medication when it approved the first drug to end a pregnancy:
mifepristone (previously known as RU-486).55 Today, medication
abortion in the United States is accomplished with two drugs. The first,
mifepristone, blocks the hormone progesterone, which is necessary for

Fact Sheet, President Biden Announces Actions in Light of Today’s Supreme
Court Decision on Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (June 24, 2022),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2022/06/24/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-actions-in-light-oftodays-supreme-court-decision-on-dobbs-v-jackson-womens-health-organization/.
52 Khaleda Rahman, Roe v. Wade Being Overturned Will Harm Black Women the Most,
NEWSWEEK (Nov. 29, 2021), https://www.newsweek.com/overturning-roe-harmblack-women-most-1653082.
53 But see Rachel Rebouché, The Public Health Turn in Reproductive Rights, 78 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1355, 1416-28 (2021) (describing the abortion access in “without
Roe”).
54 Michelle Oberman, What Will and Won’t Happen When Abortion is Banned, 9 J. L. &
BIOSCIENCES 1 (2022) (noting countries that ban abortion and still have relatively
high abortion rates); Yvonne Lindgren, When Patients Are Their Own Doctors: Roe v.
Wade in An Era of Self-Managed Care, 107 CORNELL L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3793851.
55 Greer Donley, Medication Abortion Exceptionalism, 107 CORNELL L. REV. 627, 10
(2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3795414.
51
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a pregnancy to continue.56 The second drug, misoprostol, is taken 24
to 48 hours after mifepristone and causes uterine contractions that
expel the pregnancy from the uterus.57 Misoprostol is not FDAapproved to terminate a pregnancy, but is used off label for this and a
variety of other obstetric purposes.
As discussed further in Part III, the FDA has historically
prevented mifepristone from being prescribed in the same manner as
most other drugs. Until recently, the agency required patients to pick
up the drug in person from a “certified provider,” which was almost
always at an abortion clinic.58 In December 2021, based on years of
evidence showing the drug can be prescribed and used safely without
such strict controls, the FDA removed the requirement that patients
pick up the drug in person.59 It nevertheless maintained other
restrictions on medication abortion that are unsupported by the
evidence and not applied to comparably safe drugs.60
The removal of the in-person dispensing requirement opened
the door for what will become a key part of abortion’s future: abortion
untethered to a clinical space. Patients now can obtain a legal abortion
after meeting via telehealth with an abortion provider who prescribes
abortion medication that they then take at the location of their choice.61
For example, the first large-scale telehealth abortion service run by a
U.S.-based provider, Abortion on Demand (AOD), launched in April
2021 and operates in 22 states.62 The AOD founder is a physician
licensed in each of those 22 states. AOD prescribes medication
abortion through eight weeks of pregnancy, rather than ten weeks as
allowed by the FDA, and only for those over eighteen in order to
ensure compliance with parental involvement restrictions.63 According
Mifeprex (mifepristone) Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., (last updated Dec.
16, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/postmarket-drug-safety-informationpatients-and-providers/mifeprex-mifepristone-information.
57 Rachel K. Jones & Jenna Jerman, Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the
United States, 2014, 49 PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 1, 6 (2017).
58 Donley, supra note 54, at 15-21.
59 Mifeprex (mifepristone) Information, supra note 55.
60 Response Letter from FDA CDER to American Association of Pro-Life
Obstetricians and Gynecologists and American College of Pediatricians (Dec. 16,
2022), https://www.regulations.gov/document/FDA-2019-P-1534-0016.
[hereinafter FDA Letter]
61 Rebouché, Donley & Cohen, supra note 16; Carrie N. Baker, How Telemedicine
Startups Are Revolutionizing Abortion Health Care in the U.S., MS. MAG. (Nov. 16,
2020), https://msmagazine.com/2020/11/16/just-the-pill-choix-carafemhoneybee-health-how-telemedicine-startups-are-revolutionizing-abortion-healthcare-in-the-u-s.
62 Where is AOD Available?, ABORTION ON DEMAND (last visited Jan. 30, 2022),
https://abortionondemand.org/. Remote medication abortion first became
available two years ago after a federal district court issued an injunction that
temporarily suspended in-person collection during the COVID-19 pandemic.
63 Id. Other virtual clinics, such as Choix and Hey Jane, provide medication
abortion through ten weeks of pregnancy. Baker, supra note 60.
56
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to its founder, AOD is built for scale over scope, delivering medication
abortion to patients who do not present complicated cases and
adopting a patient protective strategy through a rigorous screening
process.64
The platform used by AOD was built with telehealth
regulations in mind: the process is designed to protect patient privacy
and in compliance with the privacy protections of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act.65 It is the same for every state in
which AOD operates, even in states with 24-hour waiting periods.66
The intake is asynchronous with informed consent delivered by a prerecorded video; a video appointment with the physician follows. AOD
works with an online pharmacy that then ships the medication directly
to the patient with an option for express overnight shipping. The entire
process—from counseling to receipt of abortion pills—takes between
two to five days, depending on the state, and AOD charges $289 (and
$239 for patients self-reporting financial need), which is around two to
three hundred dollars less than abortions offered by a clinic.67
Before Dobbs and even with the in-person restriction
jettisoned, remote abortion care was not available everywhere. Virtual
providers could only operate in states that had not banned
telemedicine for abortion or did not require in-person dispensation of
abortion medication—nineteen states have such laws.68 AOD verifies
that the patient is in a state permitting remote provision by tracking IP
addresses to confirm location at patient intake. If the IP address
indicates a location different than the location claimed by the patient,
the patient is asked to provide an in-state identification.69
Nevertheless, there are three ways in which remote care can
assist people in states that ban abortion. First, patients traveling to a
state that allows remote abortion care could travel across the border to
have their telehealth appointment, rather than travel further into the
state to a brick-and-mortar clinic. This can mean the difference of
hundreds of miles—and the extra cost of gas and time that come with
it. Indeed, some providers are considering building satellite sites or

Telephone interview with AOD Founder, held by Rachel Rebouché (Aug. 3,
2021) (on file with author) [hereinafter AOD Interview].
65 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C.S. § 55357.
66 Counseling online is time stamped and shipment of medication abortion does
not mail until 24 hours have passed. Patients’ digital signatures have an audit trail
with an email only the patient has access to. AOD Interview, supra note 6364.
67 Baker, supra note60.
68 Medication Abortion, supra note 17.
69 This can happen when a patient is close to a border of a state with a law
prohibiting telehealth for abortion. Id.
64
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placing mobile clinics at antiabortion state borders to make telehealth
visits easier.70
Second, some providers do not rely on IP addresses to assess
a person’s location, but, as is the standard of care for most health
services, ask patients to provide their address.71 Providers would thus
have difficulty knowing if a person is using the mailing address of a
friend or family member or renting a post office box in a state where
telabortion is legal.72 Some virtual providers warn against trying to
circumvent state law through, for example, VPNs or mail forwarding.73
Extralegal strategies can have costs, particularly for those already
vulnerable to state surveillance and punishment.74 How such measures
will now be policed raises additional questions.75 The ability to receive
abortion pills by mail in ways that defy detection is sure to encumber
efforts to eliminate abortion in this country.76
Third, people can (and do) circumvent legal requirements and
order medication abortion online regardless of where they live. Even
when Roe was in place, gaining access to abortion was a struggle for
many people, particularly those who live in rural areas or below the
poverty level. Aid Access is an international non-profit that serves
people across the country, including those who live in states that ban
abortion.77 Asserting jurisdiction over international actors is difficult
for any state, so even though a state may view this conduct to be illegal,
state and federal actors have so far been unable to stop it.78 Aid Access
offers medication abortion to patients within the first 10 weeks of
pregnancy and costs $110.79 For states where either abortion or
telehealth for abortion is banned, European-based physicians review
the patients’ consultation forms and prescribe them the medications,
which are delivered by an India-based pharmacy within one to three
weeks. The organization saw a dramatic increase in requests from
See Melville House (@melvillehouse), TWITTER (Oct. 26, 2021, 1:45 PM),
https://twitter.com/melvillehouse/status/1453055176684748810.
71 Baker, supra note 60.
72 The Plan C Guide to Abortion Pills, PLAN C (last visited Jan. 5, 2022),
https://www.plancpills.org/states/texas#results-anchor.
73 Donley, supra note 54, at 66; AOD Interview, supra note 63.
74 Donley, supra note 54, at 32.
75 Jareb A. Gleckel & Sheryl L. Wulkan, Abortion and Telemedicine: Looking Beyond
COVID-19 and the Shadow Docket, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 105, 112 (2021).
76 Greer Donley, Rachel Rebouché, & David S. Cohen, Abortion Pills Will Change a
Post-Roe World, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/23/opinion/abortion-pills-online-roe-vwade.html.
77 Consultation, AID ACCESS (Sept. 14, 2021), https://perma.cc/8BWQ-2WSQ.
78 Even under the Trump Administration, the federal government was unable to
stop the organization. https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcementand-criminal-investigations/warning-letters/aidaccessorg-575658-03082019.
79 The cost is $150 when using a US-based provider and when the patient is in a
state permitting mailed medication abortion. Aid Access, Consultation, July 30,
2022, https://aidaccess.org/en/i-need-an-abortion.
70

13

DRAFT 8/4/22
IF QUOTING, PLEASE INDICATE THIS IS A DRAFT

Texans after SB8 went into effect, increasing demand over 1000% for
a few weeks and eventually leveling out to 250% of its pre-SB8
demand.80 And, “[a]t the county level, distance to an abortion clinic
and living below the federal poverty level were associated with a higher
rate of requests.”81 In other words, those who cannot travel will be
more likely to self-manage.
People seeking abortion also can self-manage their
abortions—that is, buy the medication online from an international
pharmacy—without any involvement from a healthcare provider or
organization like AOD or Aid Access. Plan C is a website that informs
pregnant people how they can order abortion medication from foreign
suppliers, even in states that view this action as illegal.82 Although Plan
C offers detailed instructions about how to use the medication, some
worry that the lack of a provider’s involvement may increase the
abortion’s risks. However, studies conducted in both this country and
others demonstrate that people can safely and effectively end their own
pregnancies without the involvement of a provider.83 Unlike the “backalley abortions” of generations ago, self-managed medication abortion
early in pregnancy opens the door for safe access even without legal
permission. Thus, with Roe overturned, people in the states that ban
abortion can have access to safe and effective remote abortion care.
There are some important limitations to note.84 Even if
medication abortion can be prescribed remotely in a safe way, there
remain legal risks.85 Historically, abortion bans have targeted providers,
but the rise of telehealth and self-management, where the provider
might be beyond the state’s reach or non-existent, suggests that
enforcement of state abortion laws will target the people who seek
abortion or those who assist them.86 Poor people and people of color
will be prosecuted disproportionately and face greater legal risks

Tanya Basu, Activists Are Helping Texans Get Access to Abortion Pills Online, MIT
TECH. R. (Sept. 15, 2021),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/09/15/1035790/abortion-pills-onlinetexas-sb8/.
81 Id.
82 Patrick Adams, Amid Covid-19, a Call for M.D.s to Mail the Abortion Pill, N.Y. TIMES
(May 12, 2020).
83 Abigail R. A. Aiken et al., Demand for Self-Managed Medication Abortion Through an
Online Telemedicine Service in the United States, 110 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 90 (2020).
84 As well as many new legal battles on the way. Rachel Rebouché, David S. Cohen,
& Greer Donley, The Coming Legal Battles Over Abortion Pills, Politico (May 24, 2022),
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/05/24/coming-legal-battlesabortion-pills-00034558.
85 Donley, supra note 54, at 31-33.
86 Greer Donley & Jill Weiber Lens, Abortion, Pregnancy Loss, and Subjective Fetal
Personhood, 75 Vand. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022); Andrea Rowan, Prosecuting Women
for Self-Inducing Abortion: Counterproductive and Lacking Compassion, 18 GUTTMACHER
POL’Y REV. 70 (2015).
80
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compared to those who are white or have wealth.87 The story of Lizelle
Herrera offers a stark warning: In April 2022, Hererra was charged
with murder for self-inducing an abortion. The charges were quickly
dropped,88 but allowing criminal charges against the people seeking
abortion could be next in antiabortion states. Even if states do not
target patients with laws or policies, prosecutors could use unlawful
arrests such as Herrera’s as a way to scare and chill illegal abortion.
Another qualification is that the FDA has approved use of
abortion pills only through the first ten weeks even though research
suggests it can be safely used a few weeks beyond that and providers
can prescribe it off-label past ten weeks.89 Though some people will
use it through the 11th or, for some patients, the 12th week of
pregnancy, when the same protocol is still safe and effective, the
standard of care is to recommend that second or third trimester
abortion patients travel to a state where clinics can perform a
procedural abortion.90 However, as medication abortion becomes
more prevalent, particularly as an online service at lower cost, the
financial sustainability of brick-and-mortar clinics will be put to the
test, even at a time when facilities in abortion-supportive states see
more patients.91 Many facilities already operate at a loss, due in no small
part to the costs of complying with state restrictions.92 If more people
access early abortion without clinic involvement, new issues of
sustainability will arise for some clinics.
As smaller providers are driven out of business, large clinical
centers will concentrate in the urban areas of states with supportive
abortion laws.93 Patients requiring abortions after the first trimester or
MICHELE GOODWIN, POLICING THE WOMB: INVISIBLE WOMEN AND THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD (2020).
88 Guilia Heyward & Sophie Kasakove, Texas Will Dismiss Murder Charge Against
Woman Connected to ‘Self-Induced Abortion,’ N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/10/us/texas-self-induced-abortion-chargedismissed.html.
89 Donley, supra note 54, at 63.
90 Second trimester abortion is rare—only 6.2% of abortions occur in the second
trimester. Third trimester abortions are extremely rare, less than 1%. But as
abortion becomes more difficult to access, it is possible that the number of later
abortions increase, and that some of these abortion seekers will self-manage with
pills. There are protocols online where one can find a more accurate dose for a later
pregnancy that is still reasonably safe and effective, although less so than a
procedural abortion. CDCs Abortion Surveillance System FAQs, CTRS. DISEASE
CONTROL (last reviewed Nov. 21, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/data_stats/abortion.htm.
91 AOD contributes 60 percent of all profits to the Save Our Clinics fund of the
Abortion Care Network. Baker, supra note 60.
92 Michelle L. McGowan et al., Care Churn—Why Keeping Clinic Doors Open Isn’t
Enough to Ensure Access to Abortion, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 508, 509 (2020).
93 For instance, a Planned Parenthood designed as a regional hub recently opened
in Illinois. Grace Hauck, Planned Parenthood To Open Major Clinic In Illinois As
'Regional Haven' For Abortion Access, USA TODAY (updated Oct. 3, 2019),
87
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who are not candidates for medication abortion (because of preexisting conditions, for example) will have far fewer options located in
only the most populous areas of certain states.94
Further, while online medication abortion may be increasingly
available, it is an option that is only now becoming more widely
understood or embraced. A study from 2021 found that 25% of people
seeking abortions at clinics attempt self-managed abortion first and the
vast majority of them use an ineffective and potentially dangerous
method: 52% use supplements, herbs, or vitamins; 19% use many
contraceptive pills; and 18% use physical trauma.95 In the same study,
only 18% used medication abortion.96 The response to SB8 in Texas
provides another illustration. Although Aid Access received a large
increase in requests from Texans after SB8,97 clinics across the country
were also inundated with demand from Texans.98 While Aid Access
may be significantly cheaper and more convenient than traveling for a
legal abortion, prior to Dobbs, it had not yet become mainstream and
as noted below, barriers to telehealth may also have impacted uptake.
In other words, given the need for abortion beyond the first trimester,
the barriers to telehealth, and a lack of familiarity with abortion pills,
some abortion access will depend on travel. As we have noted, whether
providers in abortion-supportive states can handle the influx of
demand remains to be seen.
A post-Roe country is a fractured legal landscape that
necessitates time, resources, and tenacity to navigate. In the following
parts, we set out the jurisdictional complications that will arise. The
picture we paint is labyrinthine, and the ground we cover is largely
unexplored: some states will assume roles as interstate abortion police,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/10/02/illinois-plannedparenthood-mega-clinic-haven-abortion-access/3840714002/.
94 People taking certain kinds of blood thinners, for instance, are not candidates for
medication abortion and are disproportionately people of color and people with
low incomes. See Ruqaiijah Yearby, Breaking the Cycle of “Unequal Treatment” with
Health Care Reform: Acknowledging and Addressing the Continuation of Racial Bias, 44
CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1305-06 (2012).
95 Explained: Barriers to Abortion and Attempted Self-Managed Abortion, ADVANCING
NEW STANDARDS IN REPROD. HEALTH (Oct. 26, 2021),
https://www.ansirh.org/research/infographic/explained-barriers-abortion-andattempted-self-managed-abortion.
96 Id.
97 Basu, supra note 79. The Guttmacher Institute reported that patients were
traveling beyond those states that immediately border Texas, going instead to at
least twelve other states. Jones et al., supra note 43; Tuma, supra note 43; Shefali
Luthra, Abortion clinics north of Texas flooded with patients after severe state ban, THE
GUARDIAN (Sep. 21, 2021),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/21/abortion-clinics-borderingtexas-are-seeing-double-the-number-of-patients.
98 Mary Tuma, Texas' abortion ban is having a 'domino effect' on clinics across the U.S.,
TEXAS OBSERVER, Nov. 18, 2021, https://www.texasobserver.org/texas-abortionban-is-having-a-domino-effect-on-clinics-across-the-u-s/.
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others will attempt to protect all abortion provision however they can,
while the current federal government might create new spaces, within
and outside of hostile states, for abortion access.
II.

INTERSTATE BATTLES OVER CROSS-BORDER ABORTION

After Roe, state prosecutors and legislators will likely try to
impose civil or criminal liability on their citizens who travel out of state
to obtain an abortion, those who help them, and the providers who
care for them. Though targeting cross-border abortion provision has
been almost non-existent until this point,99 antiabortion states are likely
to attempt it in the post-Roe future. This is hardly far-fetched: the
antiabortion movement has been clear that the endgame is outlawing
abortion nationwide.100 Since Dobbs, some in the movement have been
explicit about their goal of ending abortion travel, such as the president
of Students for Life who advocated as part of national post-Roe plans
that “if you travel out of state for an abortion, that abortionist can be
held liable.”101 Until there is a national ban, the movement will use state
powers to stop as many abortions as possible, including outside state
borders.
Missouri, with almost no in-state abortions yet roughly 10,000
of its residents traveling out of state to receive care each year,102 has
In 1996, a Pennsylvania woman was prosecuted for taking a minor to New York
for an abortion (with the minor’s consent). Woman Faces Trial For Taking 13-YearOld To Outstate Abortion Clinic, AP NEWS (Oct. 27, 1996)
https://apnews.com/article/9d6313302114d7881dd2ecaa083f9b91. Beyond that,
there have been no publicized prosecutions for cross-border abortions. In theory,
they could happen. Before Dobbs, forty-three states banned abortion after a
particular point in pregnancy, yet patients who needed care later in pregnancy
regularly traveled to states where later abortion care was legal. To the best of our
knowledge, none of these patients were prosecuted for doing so.
100 Amici in Dobbs argued as well that the Court should overturn Roe by finding that
fetuses are protected persons under the Fourteenth Amendment; doing so could
have the effect of outlawing abortion everywhere. Brief Amici Curiae for Scholars
of Jurisprudence John M. Finnis and Robert P. George in Support of Petitioners,
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021) (No. 19-1392).
101 Kitchener, Roe’s Gone, supra note 8.
102 According to state records, in 2020, only 167 abortions were performed in the
state, down from over 6,000 a decade earlier. Josh Merchant, Nearly Half of Abortions
in Kansas Are for Missouri Residents, but Voters Could End That, KAN. CITY BEACON
(Nov. 20, 2021), https://www.kcur.org/news/2021-11-20/nearly-half-ofabortions-in-kansas-are-for-missouri-residents-but-voters-could-end-that. Yet,
almost 10,000 Missouri patients obtained abortions that year by traveling to Illinois
and Kansas. According to the Illinois Department of Public Health, in 2020, 6,578
people from Missouri obtained abortions in Illinois, up from 1,035 in 2015. Illinois
Department of Public Health, Abortion Statistics 2020, https://dph.illinois.gov/datastatistics/vital-statistics/abortion-statistics.html. And according to data from the
Kansas Department of Health and Environment’s Division of Public Health, that
same year 3,201 people from Missouri obtained abortions in Kansas. Kansas
Department of Health and Environment, Abortions in Kansas, 2020,
https://www.kdhe.ks.gov/DocumentCenter/View/10433/Abortions-in-Kansas99
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shown us the early phases of this strategy. In March 2021, a legislator
introduced SB603, which would apply all Missouri abortion
restrictions to conduct occurring “[p]artially within and partially
outside this state” as well as conduct wholly outside the state when any
one of the following conditions are met: the pregnant person resides
in Missouri; there is a substantial connection between the pregnant
person and Missouri; the “unborn child” is a resident of Missouri at
the time of conception; the pregnant person intends to give birth in
Missouri if the pregnancy is carried to term; the individual had sex in
Missouri that “may have” conceived this pregnancy; or the patient
sought prenatal care in Missouri during the pregnancy.103
Then, in March 2022, a different legislator introduced an
amendment to another antiabortion bill that would have created civil
liability for anyone who performs an abortion on a resident of
Missouri, no matter where the abortion is performed, or helps
someone from Missouri leave the state to get an abortion.104 These laws
would have been enforced through civil suits rather than the criminal
law, making it harder for courts to strike them down as
unconstitutional.105 After receiving national attention, this amendment
failed to be included in the final bill,106 though after Dobbs the legislator
who drafted the bill vowed to continue this effort; reports indicate
antiabortion legislators in other parts of the country are considering
similar measures.107
Several cities in Texas have adopted the label “sanctuary city
for the unborn.” At least two of them have included in the ordinances
adopting this moniker a provision that bans their residents from
getting abortions “regardless of where the abortion is or will be
performed.”108 Warnings about cross-border abortion restrictions are
far from the “ridiculous scaremonger[ing]” the general counsel for the

2020-PDF. These numbers are more than three times the preliminary estimates
from the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. See Merchant, supra
(graph showing estimate of 3391 total abortions for Missouri residents with only
167 occurring in state).
103 S.B. 603, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2021).
104 HB 2012, 102nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2022).
105 See discussion of SB8 infra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
106 Tessa Weinberg, Missouri House Blocks Effort to Limit Access to Out-of-State
Abortions, MISSOURI INDEPENDENT, Mar. 29, 2022,
https://missouriindependent.com/2022/03/29/missouri-house-blocks-effort-tolimit-access-to-out-of-state-abortions/
107 Kitchener, Roe’s Gone, supra note 8.
108 Cisco Ordinance Outlawing Abortion, Aug. 19, 2021,
https://www.scribd.com/document/567480915/Cisco-Ordinance-OutlawingAbortion-08-19-21-Docx-1; Slaton, Texas Ordinance Outlawing Abortion Within
the City Limits, July 8, 2021.
https://www.scribd.com/document/569256021/Slaton-Texas-OrdinanceOutlawing-Abortion-Within-the-City-Limits-07-08-2021-Docx-1.
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National Right to Life Committee has claimed they are.109 In fact, that
organization’s model post-Roe law—a document drafted by the general
counsel—includes a provision that prohibits assisting minors
“regardless of where an illegal abortion occurs.”110 Bills like those
discussed here could become a reality in a future with no constitutional
right to abortion, as antiabortion legislators look for ways to not only
stop abortions in their borders, but also to stop their residents from
obtaining abortions anywhere.
To many people, the immediate response to these possibilities
is that various parts of the federal Constitution protect the right to
travel and to engage in interstate commerce. After all, most people
think that as long as they follow the laws of the state where they are
physically located while traveling, they are being a law-abiding citizens.
Take fireworks or casino gambling as examples. The person who
travels out of her state that bans the sale of fireworks or casino
gambling in order to purchase fireworks in another state or gamble in
Las Vegas or Atlantic City probably gives no thought whatsoever to
the possibility that her home state would try to punish her for evading
state law.
This sense of how law works across state borders finds some
support in various constitutional doctrines. The Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause has long protected a right to travel
as part of its protection for liberty.111 The same Amendment’s
Privileges or Immunities Clause, in conjunction with the Citizenship
Clause, has also protected a right to travel rooted in the notion of
national citizenship.112 And the Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits
certain state burdens on interstate commerce, including some that have
extraterritorial effect.113 However, as explained in detail below, these
parts of the Constitution and the doctrines they have inspired do not
so clearly apply to the situations addressed here.
This Part addresses the complex array of interjurisdictional
issues that arise from the possible extraterritorial application of state
laws. It assesses the possibilities of using already-existing law to
prosecute actions in another state and of adopting specific civil or
criminal laws that target extraterritorial abortion and the likelihood of
success of constitutional objections to doing so. It then addresses the
complicated issues that would arise when abortion-supportive states

Kent Nishimura, Could Idaho Accuse a Washington Abortion Clinic of Murder? Some
Are Worried, THE CHRONICLE, June 22, 2022,
https://www.chronline.com/stories/could-idaho-accuse-a-washington-abortionclinic-of-murder-some-are-worried,295760.
110 NRLC Model Law, supra note 11.
111 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
112 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)
113 Healy v. Beer Inst. Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
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attempt to protect their providers from extraterritorial investigations
and prosecutions.
One further note before proceeding: even if courts permit
these interjurisdictional prosecutions and lawsuits to proceed, states
may struggle to enforce their laws extraterritorially against providers
who refuse to appear at a summons or participate in a lawsuit. There
will be difficulties related to personal jurisdiction,114 vicinage,115 and
problems of proof particular to interstate investigations.116 It is for
these reasons that antiabortion states, and even the federal government
under the Trump Administration, have not been able to stop Aid
Access from delivering abortion pills in their states. Though this
Article does not plumb these practical issues, they will certainly add to
the interjurisdictional complexities explored throughout.
A. Extraterritoriality in Abortion Law Precedent
Only two cases decided after Roe—one by the US Supreme
Court and the other by the Missouri Supreme Court—have addressed
whether states can penalize out-of-state abortion conduct, and the
modern application of those cases is unclear at best.117 The first is a
lesser-known Supreme Court case, Bigelow v. Virginia.118 That case
concerned a Virginia statute prohibiting any publication from
encouraging people to obtain an abortion.119 In 1971, two years before
Roe, a weekly newspaper distributed on the University of Virginia
campus ran an advertisement for a New York City service that would
refer people to an abortion provider in New York, where abortion had
recently become legal.120 The Virginia Supreme Court twice upheld the
See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Bullion v. Gillespie, 895
F.2d 213, 214 (5th Cir. 1990).
115 “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed” U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Seth Kreimer, Lines in the
Sand, The Importance of Borders in American Federalism, 150 U. Penn. L. Rev. 973, 101819 (2002) (Appendix listing “[t]hirty-three states [that] have constitutional
provisions that require juries in criminal trials to be drawn from the geographical
district in which the crime occurred).
116 Susan F. Appleton, Gender, Abortion, and Travel After Roe’s End, 51 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 655 (2007).
117 Roe’s companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) addressed a provision
of Georgia law that prohibited out-of-staters from getting an abortion in Georgia.
This type of restriction seems far afield from extraterritorial application of abortion
law we foresee if Roe is overturned, since it is hard to imagine in the current
political climate that a state which continues to allow abortion within its borders
would pass a new law also restricting it to state citizens. Thus, we are not including
Doe in this line of precedent that has already addressed the issues we are covering
here.
118 Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
119 Id. at 811.
120 Id. at 811-12.
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conviction of the newspaper’s managing editor for violating the
Virginia statute, both before and after Roe was decided.121
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. In finding that the statute
infringed on the publisher’s First Amendment rights, the Court made
several statements casting doubt on the ability of states to legislate the
behavior of their citizens when they travel to another state. The Court
was concerned that Virginia, a state where abortion was illegal when
the newspaper advertisement in question was published,122 was
infringing on its citizens’ ability to travel to New York for an
abortion.123 In discussing these cross-border issues, the Court wrote
that Virginia could not “prevent its residents from traveling to New
York to obtain [abortion] services or, as the State conceded [at oral
argument], prosecute them for going there.”124 Broadening this
position to a more general statement about extraterritorial application
of state law, the Court stated categorically that a “State does not acquire
power or supervision over the internal affairs of another State merely
because the welfare and health of its own citizens may be affected
when they travel to that State.”125
The other case comes from Missouri, and it relied on Bigelow to
reach the same conclusion. In Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Nixon,126
the Missouri Supreme Court reviewed a Missouri law providing a civil
cause of action against any person who causes, aids, or abets a minor
obtaining an abortion without first getting parental consent or a
judicial bypass.127 As part of the lawsuit, the plaintiffs lodged a
challenge to a unique provision of the Missouri law that effectively
required Missouri minors who travel out of state for an abortion to
follow Missouri’s parental consent law, even if the other state has a
different requirement for parental involvement or none whatsoever.128
In response to this argument, the Missouri Supreme Court
reiterated the main points from Bigelow. It wrote that “it is beyond
Missouri’s authority to regulate conduct that occurs wholly outside of
Missouri . . . . Missouri simply does not have the authority to make
lawful out-of-state conduct actionable here, for its laws do not have
extraterritorial effect.”129 Because of this principle against
Id. at 814-15.
Id. at 812-13.
123 Bill Kovach, Rockefeller, Signing Abortion Bill, Credits Women's Groups, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 12, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/04/12/archives/rockefellersigning-abortion-bill-credits-womens-groups.html.
124 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 824; see also id. at 827 (“[The public interest] would not justify
a Virginia statute that forbids Virginians from using in New York the then legal
services of a local New York agency.”).
125 Id.
126 Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Nixon, 220 S.W.3d 732 (Mo. 2007).
127 Id. at 736.
128 Id. at 745.
129 Id. at 742.
121
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extraterritorial application, the court held that the law was only valid
as to conduct occurring at least in part in Missouri. Thus, the legality
of an out-of-state abortion must be a defense to crimes charged under
the law that consisted of “wholly out-of-state conduct.”130
Though these two precedents contain strong statements
against the application of extraterritorial abortion law, they might not
be the final say on the matter. Bigelow is dated, relies on part on the
now-overturned Roe, and concentrated on the First Amendment. The
current U.S. Supreme Court, now that it has eviscerated Roe, could
revisit Bigelow’s anti-extraterritoriality principle.131 Moreover, scholars
have argued for decades about whether Bigelow’s statements against
extraterritorial application are mere dicta.132 Nixon is applicable only in
Missouri, gives no clear guidance as to what is “conduct that occurs
wholly outside” the state, and has never been cited by any court for its
discussion of extraterritorial application of state law.
Complicating this picture even further is how these rules apply
to medication abortion. Abortion pills did not exist at the time of
Bigelow and were not widely used at the time of Nixon. These
medications can be legally obtained in one jurisdiction, one or both of
the drugs can be taken elsewhere, and the pregnancy can end
somewhere else entirely. In the immediate aftermath of Roe’s demise,
abortion providers and lawyers reviewing medication abortion
protocols are struggling to answer what had been a simple question
with procedural abortion: where does the abortion occur?133
Thus, this area of law is ripe for reassessment once
interjurisdictional abortion prosecutions occur. Antiabortion states
and cities will not wait for the Court to give them permission to apply
their laws extraterritorially; as the Missouri bills and sanctuary city
Id. at 743.
The question of Bigelow’s continuing validity has been overturned looms as yet
another complicated constitutional issue now that Roe has been overturned. See,
e.g., Cat Zakrzewski, South Carolina Bill Outlaws Websites That Tell How to Get an
Abortion, WASH. POST, July 22, 2022,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/07/22/south-carolina-billabortion-websites/.
132 Compare Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to
Travel, and Extra Terroritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451,
462-64, 487-519 (1992), with Mark D. Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?: Positive,
Normative, and Institutional Considerations of States’ Extraterritorial Powers, 51 ST. LOUIS.
UNIV. L.J. 713, 714 (2007) [hereinafter Rosen, Pluralism]; Mark D. Rosen, State
Extraterritorial Powers Reconsidered, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133 (2010) [hereinafter
Rosen, State Powers]; Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in
American Federalism, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 855 (2002) [hereinafter Rosen,
Heterogeneity].
133 See, e.g., Katheryn Houghton & Arielle Zionts, Montana Clinics Preemptively Restrict
Out-of-State Patients’ Access to Abortion Pills, NPR, July 7, 2022,
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2022/07/07/1110078914/montanaabortion-pills.
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ordinances described above make clear, they will just do it. It could
take years before the litigation surrounding these cases reaches the
Supreme Court, and in the meantime, states will proceed as if they have
the power, waiting for courts to call their bluff. Indeed, litigation
surrounding SB8 illustrates that some courts will exploit any legal
uncertainty to uphold abortion restrictions. No one believed SB8 was
constitutional, yet it has survived court challenges so far.134 Indeed, the
2022 Missouri bill relied on a similar enforcement mechanism as SB8,
ostensibly to shield the law, if enacted, from federal court review. The
Supreme Court may very well ultimately reaffirm its previous
statements from Bigelow, but that is far from a foregone conclusion.
Amidst this less-than-certain legal backdrop, prosecutions and civil
liability related to extraterritorial conduct are on the horizon. There are
two different questions that arise in the context of extraterritorial
application of abortion law. The first, considered below in section II.B,
is whether a state can apply its general abortion laws, by themselves or
in conjunction with other non-abortion criminal laws, to out-of-state
abortions even though these laws do not explicitly cover them. The
second question, considered in section II.C, is whether there are
constitutional impediments to states passing and enforcing new laws
that specifically target out-of-state abortion.135 Finally, section II.D
explores how abortion-supportive states are legislating to protect their
providers, as well as traveling patients and those who help them, from
application of another state’s abortion law.
B. Do Ordinary Criminal Abortion Laws Apply Extraterritorially?
If, say, Kentucky bans all abortion following Dobbs, can
prosecutors apply that abortion ban, which says nothing about
extraterritorial application, to someone from Kentucky who travels to
Illinois to obtain a legal abortion or to the Illinois provider who
performs that abortion? Or, could Kentucky use its non-abortion
conspiracy laws to charge the patient’s friend who helps the patient
travel to Illinois to obtain the out-of-state abortion? An aggressive
prosecutor or other state official would not need any specific law
governing extraterritorial abortions if existing state law can be applied
to legal abortions obtained in other states or to travel to obtain those
legal out-of-state abortions. In fact, even if existing state law cannot be
applied in these situations, an aggressive prosecutor could still chill
people from obtaining lawful out of state abortions just by threatening
legal sanctions in these situations or even by initiating legal proceedings
knowing they will fail.136
Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021); Whole Woman’s
Health v. Jackson, 31 F.4th 1004 (5th Cir. 2022).
135 These constitutional considerations would also apply to a state using alreadyexisting laws to prosecute abortion travel.
136 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dischman, 195 A.3d 567 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(prosecutor charged pregnant woman with violating state “aggravated assault of an
134

23

DRAFT 8/4/22
IF QUOTING, PLEASE INDICATE THIS IS A DRAFT

As a general matter, states cannot use ordinary criminal laws to
prosecute people for crimes committed outside of their borders. This
“general rule” is, according to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, “accepted as ‘axiomatic’ by the courts in this country.”137
However, this general rule against extraterritorial application of
criminal law has enough gaps to allow prosecution of a wide variety of
crimes that take place outside the jurisdiction of a state. It is beyond
the scope of this Article to explore all the twists and turns of this rule,
but a few examples suffice to support our general point here.
First, the “effects doctrine” allows states to prosecute someone
for actions that take place outside the state that have detrimental
effects in the state. The California Supreme Court has explained that
“a state may exercise jurisdiction over criminal acts that take place
outside of the state if the results of the crime are intended to, and do,
cause harm within the state.”138 This doctrine could have a sweeping
impact without Roe. Take Georgia’s six-week abortion ban that was
passed in 2019, immediately enjoined as unconstitutional, but now is
back in effect after Dobbs139; in addition to banning abortion at six
weeks, it also declared that “unborn children are a class of living,
distinct person” who deserve “full legal protection.”140 The actions of
a pregnant Georgian who crosses state lines to obtain a legal abortion
outside Georgia would have the effect of killing a “living, distinct”
Georgian deserving of “full legal protection.”141 An aggressive
prosecutor could use this effects doctrine to argue that the out-of-state
killing has the in-state effect of removing a recognized member of the
Georgia community from existence and prosecuting in this instance
recognizes the full legal protection required under the statute. While
prosecutions for murders occurring in another state are rare under this
doctrine,142 states and prosecutors seeking to enforce new criminal laws
unborn child” law despite clear language in the statute indicating the law does not
permit such charges).
137 In re Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d 606, 610 (Mass. 1999).
138 People v. Betts, 103 P.3d 883, 887 (Cal. 2005) (discussing the effects doctrine in
the context of “lewd acts committed on a child,” some of which occurred outside
the state of California); see also Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911)
(discussing this doctrine in the context of fraud committed outside the state of
Michigan but prosecuted by that state and stating that “[a]cts done outside a
jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it,
justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the
effect, if the state should succeed in getting him within its power.”).
139 Sistersong Women of Color Reprod. Just. Collective v. Kemp, 2022 WL
2824904 (11th Cir. July 20, 2022).
140 Sistersong Women of Color Reprod. Just. Collective v. Kemp, 472 F. Supp. 3d
1297 (N.D. Ga. 2020).
141 O.C.G.A. §§ 16-12-141(c)(1)(A–B).
142 See, e.g., Heath v. Jones, 941 F.2d 1126 (11th Cir. 1991) (allowing prosecution of
murder in Alabama that took place in Georgia); State v. Willoughby, 892 P.2d 1319
(Ariz. 1995) (allowing prosecution in Arizona for murder that took place in
Mexico).
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prohibiting abortion or protecting fetal “persons” may wish to deploy
this legal strategy to the maximum extent possible.
This doctrine could apply even more broadly. Anyone involved
with the killing of a “living, distinct” resident of a state with an abortion
ban could be prosecuted for the effect of depriving the state of that
now-recognized person’s life. That would include anyone who worked
at the out-of-state abortion clinic and anyone who helped the patient
travel to the clinic. Once a state declares a fetus a separate life, the
effects doctrine could result in almost endless criminal prosecutions
related to out-of-state abortions. Whether courts are willing to give
prosecutors this much authority over otherwise lawful out-of-state
activity will become a complicated jurisdictional issue that state and
possibly federal courts will confront now that Roe has been
overturned.143
Second, most states already have general criminal jurisdictional
provisions that could offer avenues for extraterritorial application of
abortion law. For instance, borrowing what Professor Gabriel Chin
calls the “reasonably representative” jurisdictional statute from
Pennsylvania,144 the complexities become obvious. The Pennsylvania
statute provides jurisdiction over any person when any of the following
occur in the state: an element of the offense; an attempt to commit an
offense; a conspiracy, attempted conspiracy, solicitation of a
conspiracy, or overt act; or an omission of a legal duty.145 The statute
also provides that any Pennsylvania law specifically applying outside its
borders creates jurisdiction if “the conduct bears a reasonable relation
to a legitimate interest of [Pennsylvania] and the actor knows or should
know that his conduct is likely to affect that interest.”146
Provisions like these create opportunities for chaos in
application of criminal laws to extraterritorial conduct. The scenarios
outlined above with respect to Georgia’s personhood law are
illustrative. Would a conspiracy between two people to obtain an
abortion out of state be chargeable in Georgia if the agreement and
travel taking place in state is considered an “overt act” in furtherance
of the conspiracy to murder the fetus (a person under Georgia law)?
Would obtaining the assistance of abortion funds or travel support
while in state be an act that provides sufficient jurisdiction to
criminalize the out-of-state abortion? How about a neighbor watching
These kinds of complicated legal questions have doomed antiabortion efforts in
the past (see Frank James, Mississippi Voters Reject Personhood Amendment by Wide
Margin, NPR (Nov. 8, 2011)), but there is no reason to be confident that would be
the case in the future, especially with an energized antiabortion movement once Roe
is overturned.
144 Gabriel J. Chin, Policy, Preemption, and Pot: Extra-Territorial Citizen Jurisdiction, 58
B.C. L. REV. 929, 933 (2017).
145 18 PA. C.S.A. § 102.
146 Id. § 102(a); see generally Commonwealth v. Peck, 242 A.3d 1274 (Pa. 2020)
(discussing application of jurisdictional statute to out of state drug crimes).
143
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an abortion-seeker’s children while she travels to another state? Or,
thinking about medication abortion, would a Georgia resident who
receives pills by mail at a friend’s house over the border in North
Carolina but returns home and takes some or all of the pills in her
home state be guilty of homicide, either because consumption of the
pills occurred in Georgia or because the fetal remains are in Georgia?
And would the friend in North Carolina be guilty of the Georgia crime
of conspiracy or aiding and abetting? These questions would be
answered state-by-state and case-by-case, all but ensuring disparate
results even within a state.
Third, even if a court found that the in-state conduct was
sufficient to establish jurisdiction, a related point of contention would
be whether a state can criminalize a conspiracy to commit an act that
is legal in the destination state but illegal in the home state.147 As Chin
points out, statutes like Pennsylvania’s generally “require that the
offense be criminalized in the out-of-state jurisdiction.”148 However,
not all states follow this rule. The California Supreme Court reserved
this question “for another day,”149 and Alabama’s criminal jurisdiction
statute leaves out the requirement that the crime be punishable in the
destination state.150
These wrinkles become even more visible in the context of
medication abortion where the provider might follow their home state’s
laws by prescribing pills to someone in their state, but the out-of-state
patient takes the pills in their home state. Would the illegal act, to go
back to the hypothetical states that started this section, as Kentucky
views it, be the provider’s actions that occurred in Illinois, where
abortion was legal, or the patient’s actions in Kentucky? That the
provider and the patient can be in two different jurisdictions over the
course of abortion care in the age of medication abortion creates a
messy situation for extraterritorial jurisdiction.151
Even without new statutes that specifically target out-of-state
abortions, prosecutors could attempt to use already existing tools to
try to limit or completely prohibit people in their state from going
Generally, a conspiracy exists when two people intend to promote or facilitate
the commission of a crime. See, e.g., 18 PA. C.S.A. § 903.
148 Chin, supra note 134, at 951-52.
149 People v. Morante, 975 P.2d 1071, 1086 (Cal. 1999) (“We reserve for another
day the issue whether a conspiracy in state to commit an act criminalized in this
state but not in the jurisdiction in which the act is committed, also may be punished
under California law.”).
150 ALA. ST. 13A-4-4 states as follows: “A conspiracy formed in this state to do an
act beyond the state, which, if done in this state, would be a criminal offense, is
indictable and punishable in this state in all respects if such conspiracy had been to
do such act in this state.” This law has not appeared in any reported decisions, so it
would be ripe for testing from an aggressive antiabortion prosecutor trying to stop
people in the state from working with others to obtain an out-of-state abortion
now that Roe has been overturned.
151 See discussion supra note 148 and accompanying text.
147

26

DRAFT 8/4/22
IF QUOTING, PLEASE INDICATE THIS IS A DRAFT

elsewhere to obtain legal abortions. And in doing so, state and federal
judges would ultimately be put in the position of sorting through the
complex jurisdictional questions regarding which of these applications
of already-existing law are within the bounds of state jurisdiction
principles and which exceed those limits.
C. Can States Enforce Laws Specifically Targeting Extraterritorial Abortion?
Separate from whether ordinary criminal abortion law applies
extraterritorially is the constitutionality of laws that specifically target
extraterritorial abortions instead of using existing state law to
prosecute out-of-state abortions. Much like the introduced Missouri
bills discussed above, such a law could create civil or criminal liability
for anyone with sufficient ties to the antiabortion state to obtain an
abortion anywhere, not just in the state. Or the law could impose
liability for anyone who performs or aids and abets the performance
of an abortion on a person with sufficient ties to the antiabortion state.
The law could also target abortion travel, prohibiting anyone from
traveling out of state to get an abortion or for aiding or abetting
someone in traveling out of state to get an abortion.
Without well-established doctrine or caselaw as guideposts, a
small number of scholars have attempted to parse these issues in the
past, and they fall largely into three different camps: those who believe
that extraterritorial application of abortion law would violate various
provisions of the Constitution; those who believe it would not; and
those who believe that it would raise complicated and unanswered
issues of constitutional law that would throw the Court into bitter
disputes about foundational issues of federalism.
In the first camp, scholars have relied on a right to travel,
conflict of laws, and the dormant commerce clause to cast doubt on
states’ extraterritorial reach. Professor Seth Kreimer provided the most
developed explanation of the position in the early 1990s. In two
different articles, he developed both an originalist and a normative
argument against extraterritorial application of abortion laws. In the
originalist argument, he explained that the Constitution’s framers, as
evidenced by the Commerce Clause, Article IV’s Privileges and
Immunities Clause, and the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, held a strong commitment to a legal system in which
state sovereignty was limited to application within its own borders and
to a conception of national citizenship that protected a strong right to
travel to other states.152 He argued that the right to travel to other states
and take advantage of their laws is an essential component of liberty,153
and that to further the Constitution’s goal of “establishing a single
Kreimer, supra note 132, at 487-519.
Seth F. Kreimer, “But Whoever Treasures Freedom . . .”: The Right to Travel and
Extraterritorial Abortions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 907, 914-15 (1993).
152
153
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national identity,” there is value in people having the same privileges
and responsibilities when located within a state, whether as a visitor or
a resident.154 His ultimate conclusion is that “citizens who reside in
each of the states of the Union have the right to travel to any of the
other states in order to follow their consciences, and they are entitled
to do so within the frameworks of law and morality that those sister
states provide.”155
A small group of scholars have agreed with Kreimer. Professor
Lea Brilmayer, applying conflict-of-laws principles, argued that the
policy of the “territorial state” should trump the state of residence
because states that permit abortion have a strong interest in regulating
what happens within their state.156 Taking a different approach,
Professor Susan Lorde Martin, though touching on abortion only
passingly, opined that the modern Dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine prohibits extraterritorial application of a state’s laws; indeed,
she called this principle a “bedrock of a federalist system.”157
At the other end of the spectrum lie those scholars who have
analyzed the same doctrines and concluded that there is nothing in the
Constitution that prohibits states from enforcing laws targeting outof-state abortions or abortion travel. Professor Mark Rosen has
provided the most detailed analysis, concluding that none of the
previously identified constitutional doctrines prohibit states from
applying their criminal laws outside state borders.158 According to
Rosen, the Supreme Court, state courts, and model codes have long
supported states regulating out-of-state activity.159 Rosen recognizes
that the Constitution places some limits on extraterritorial application
of state law but argues that those narrow doctrines have no
applicability when one state applies its criminal law to its own citizens
acting in another state.160 Allowing states to determine the reach of
their own powers, according to Rosen, is normatively preferable in
order to prevent people picking and choosing which state policies to
follow and to ensure actual political heterogeneity among the states.161
Id. at 919-921. (“[A] system in which my opportunities upon entering California
remain subject to the moral demands of Pennsylvania undercuts this sense of
national unity.”).
155 Id. at 938.
156 Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, the Right to Life, and the Right
to Die, 91 MICH. L. REV. 873, 884-90 (1993); see also Katherine Florey, State Courts,
State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law
and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057 (2009).
157 Susan Lorde Martin, The Extraterritoriality Doctrine of the Dormant Commerce Clause
Is Not Dead, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 497, 526 (2016).
158 Rosen, Pluralism, supra note 132, at 714; Rosen, State Powers, supra note 127;
Rosen, Heterogeneity, supra note 127. Rosen is clear in his work that Congress could
enter this field and prohibit extraterritoriality. See id.
159 Rosen, Pluralism, supra note 132, at 719-23.
160 Id. at 733-40.
161 Rosen, Heterogeneity, supra note 127, at 883-891.
154
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Rosen has developed the most sustained defense of
extraterritorial enforcement of criminal abortion law, but he is not
alone. Professor Donald Regan argued that the “reality and
significance of state citizenship” includes states having an interest in
controlling their citizens’ conduct no matter where they are.162
Professor William Van Alstyne similarly contended that there is no
constitutional right to “evade” your home state’s criminal law by
traveling to another state,163 and Professor Joseph Dellapenna
maintained that states can apply their own law extraterritorially because
people always have the option of moving to a different state if they
want to take advantage of more permissive abortion laws.164
The third camp straddles these two positions. Professor
Richard Fallon took this approach: if Roe were overturned, “very
serious constitutional questions would arise—and, somewhat
ironically, a central issue for the Supreme Court would likely be
whether the states’ interest in preserving fetal life is weighty enough to
justify them in regulating abortions that occur outside their borders.”165
After surveying the issues, Fallon explained that he had no basis to
“pronounce a confident judgment” on the issue but had “no hesitation
in concluding that this question would be a difficult one that is not
clearly resolved” by Supreme Court precedent.166 Professor Susan
Appleton agreed with Fallon, arguing that choice of law doctrine
would make any prosecution of out-of-state individuals (like the
abortion provider or the clinic worker) a highly contentious matter,
presenting courts with “excruciatingly challenging constitutional
issues.”167
While we find the first camp convincing both doctrinally and
normatively, we find Fallon’s and Appleton’s position a better
prediction of what the future holds for four reasons. First,
constitutional doctrines related to extraterritoriality are notoriously
underdeveloped. For instance, the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Privileges or Immunities Clause was given very limited application
early in its history when the Court ruled that only a very narrow set of
national privileges or immunities were protected against state

Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1865, 1908-12 (1987).
163 William W. Van Alstyne, Closing the Circle of Constitutional Review from Griswold v.
Connecticut to Roe v. Wade: An Outline of Decision Merely Overruling Roe, 1989 DUKE L.J.
1677, 1684-85 (1989).
164 Joseph W. Dellapenna, Abortion Across State Lines, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1651, 1694
(2008); cf. Reva B. Siegel, Prochoicelife: Asking Who Protects Life and How--And Why It
Matters in Law and Politics, 93 INDIANA L.J. 207 (2018)
165 Richard H. Fallon Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a PostRoe World, 51 ST. LOUIS. UNIV. L.J. 611, 613 (2007).
166 Id. at 632.
167 Appleton, supra note 112, at 682-83.
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intrusion.168 Only once has the Court used the clause to strike down a
state law.169 Since then, the Court has not taken any opportunity to
further develop the clause’s jurisprudence.170
The same can be said of the Dormant Commerce Clause and
the Citizenship Clause in this context. Before he became a Supreme
Court Justice, Tenth Circuit Judge Neil Gorsuch called the
extraterritorial principle “the least understood of the Court’s three
strands of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence.”171 Unable to
resist the pun, Judge Gorsuch continued that this strand is “certainly
the most dormant” considering the Court has used it to strike down
only three state laws.172 Commentators have noted the confusion,
calling it “all but clear”173 and bemoaning its “difficulty of application
[resulting in] courts struggl[ing] to define the extraterritorial principle’s
precise scope.”174 Yet, the extraterritoriality principle continues to
appear in lower court opinions from time to time as the basis for
striking down the occasional law, and the Supreme Court, in its 202223 term, will decide whether the principle is “now a dead letter.”175
Similarly, outside of debates about birthright citizenship, the
Citizenship Clause’s implications for federal identity—and the

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
170 Saenz has been cited only six times by the Court, and only once in a majority
opinion. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999) (citing Saenz merely for a
general quote about federalism).
171 Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 2015).
172 Id.; see also Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 378–79 (6th Cir. 2013)
(Sutton, J., concurring) (calling the doctrine “a relic of the old world with no useful
role to play in the new”).
173 Tyler L. Shearer, Locating Extraterritoriality: Association for Accessible Medicines
and the Reach of State Power, 100 B.U. L. Rev. 1501, 1504 (2020).
174 Dormant Commerce Clause—Extraterritoriality Doctrine—Fourth Circuit Invalidates
Maryland Statute Regulating Price Gouging in the Sale of Generic Drugs, 132 HARV. L. REV.
1748, 1748 (2019); Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce
Clause: A Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 73 L.A. L. REV. 979, 990-92 (2013) (arguing that
PhRMA v. Walsh marked the Court’s abandonment of a freestanding rule against
extraterritorial regulation under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine).
175 See Ass’n for Accessible Med. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 670 (4th Cir. 2018)
(striking a Maryland price gouging law because “the Act controls the prices of
transactions that occur outside the state”); see National Pork Producers v. Ross, No.
21-468 (cert. granted Mar. 28, 2022) (deciding “[w]hether allegations that a state
law has dramatic economic effects largely outside of the state and requires
pervasive changes to an integrated nationwide industry state a violation of the
dormant commerce clause, or whether the extraterritoriality principle described in
the Supreme Court’s decisions is now a dead letter…”); see generally John Fritze,
How a Supreme Court Case About Pig Farms Could Muddy Looming Debate Over Out-ofState Abortions, USA TODAY, May 12, 2022,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2022/05/12/supreme-court-outof-state-abortion-bans/9719136002/.
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promotion of a national citizenship that underpins a right to travel176—
has long been “neglected by courts and scholars.”177
That leaves the Due Process Clause as the most likely basis for
vetting the extraterritorial application of abortion law. This clause
certainly has received more attention than the other three in this
context, and Justice Kavanaugh’s Dobbs concurrence indicated his
support for constitutional protection for the right to travel.178
However, the Clause’s substantive dimension has been controversial.
Indeed, although Justice Alito took pains to distinguish abortion from
all other rights protected by the Due Process Clause,179 the opinion’s
limited view of substantive due process has caused many
commentators to question how solid the foundation is for the doctrine
as a whole.180 Indeed, Justice Thomas’s Dobbs concurrence argues that
the Due Process Clause provides no substantive protections; under
this interpretation, constitutional protections for travel, family
formation, and intimacy are all subject to Court reversal.181 Moreover,
the due process extraterritoriality doctrine the Court has developed,
which exists in the context of punitive damages for a defendant’s outof-state actions, has not been expanded.182 This leaves the clause ripe
for bitter dispute in how it should be applied to extraterritorial abortion
law.
Similarly, other legal doctrines outside of constitutional law,
like conflicts-of-law jurisprudence, are just as indeterminate. Professor
Appleton has explained that “criminal law has customarily remained
immune from scrutiny through a choice-of-law lens.”183 And Professor
Dellapenna wrote, despite forcefully arguing that conflicts doctrine
allows extraterritorial application of abortion restrictions, that “[t]his
domain is notoriously unstable and contested.”184
Second, determining the legality of extraterritorial application
of abortion law would involve resolving claims of competing
Kreimer, supra note 127, at 487-519.
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Belonging, Protection and Equality: The Neglected Citizenship
Clause and the Limits of Federalism, 62 PITT. L. REV. 281, 283 (2000).
178 He wrote: “[M]ay a State bar a resident of that State from traveling to another
State to obtain an abortion? In my view, the answer is no based on the
constitutional right to interstate travel.” Slip op. at 10 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
This discussion was in response to the dissenting opinion’s raising of this
complicated issue, which cited and discussed this article. See slip op. at 36-37
(Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, JJ., dissenting).
179 Slip op. at 66.
180 See, e.g., Jeannie Suk, When the Supreme Court Takes Away a Long-Held Constitutional
Right, THE NEW YORKER, June 24, 2022,
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/when-the-supreme-courttakes-away-a-long-held-constitutional-right.
181 Slip op. at 1-7 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
182 BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
183 Appleton, supra note 112, at 667.
184 Dellapenna, supra note 153, at 1654.
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fundamental constitutional values. Among these values are, on the side
of allowing extraterritorial application, local experimentation,
preventing the proverbial “race to the bottom,” and judicial restraint.
On the side of prohibiting extraterritorial application are the
constitutional values of national citizenship, liberty of travel, and
freedom of choice. And the interest in state sovereignty cuts both
ways, as both restrictive and permissive states want their local policy
choices to have the broadest possible reach. Having competing
constitutional values would in no way be unique to this particular issue,
as this is standard fare for most high-profile constitutional disputes.
However, because these constitutional values, which are in theory
separate from the values underlying the abortion debate, will become
proxies for the abortion debate, the conflict of fundamental values will
become even more difficult for courts to resolve.185
Third, as the short sampling of scholarly treatment of the
constitutional issues that extraterritorial application of state abortion
law shows, any solution to the constitutional question here implicates
not only competing constitutional foundational principles but also
competing notions of constitutional interpretation. Historical disputes
about the original understanding of the different clauses at issue will
lead the Court to pick among different versions of complex history,
which the Court does regularly.186 However, when the Court is put in
a position of choosing among different versions of history,
longstanding concerns about judicial neutrality come to the fore.187
And, perhaps to state the obvious, the present Supreme Court, which
relied on a contested history of abortion regulation to overturn Roe,188
might also marshal history and originalism in ways that undermine
constitutional arguments against abortions laws with extraterritorial
reach.
Fourth, and finally, given the various ways that states might
attempt to restrict extraterritorial abortions, especially in an era of
telabortion, courts will parse cases based on different facts and thus
render different outcomes based on differing in-state and out-of-state
activities. This will subject courts to the same criticism leveled at
Planned Parenthood v. Casey that any resulting standard is not workable.
Imagine different situations based on a variety of factors: the abortion
patient’s ties to the state where abortion is illegal (does she live in the
Fallon, supra note 154.
For instance, compare the majority and dissenting opinion uses of history in
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), and District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570 (2008).
187 Justice John Paul Stevens, Originalism and History, 48 GA. L. REV. 691 (2014); Saul
Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v.
Heller, 69 OHIO. ST. L.J. 625 (2008).
188 Compare Dobbs, slip op. at 45-56, with Brief of Constitutional Accountability
Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Dobbs, No. 19-1392 (2021)
(covering history to show the right to abortion is supported).
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state where she is a citizen or live temporarily elsewhere?), the
provider’s ties to the state where abortion is illegal (is she licensed in
that state but practicing elsewhere or does she have no connection to
that state at all?), the type of assistance someone else provides the
patient (does a friend provide a place to stay in the state where abortion
is legal, drive the patient across state lines, or deliver her pills from a
state where they are legal to a state where they are not?). For
telabortion, these factors are compounded by complexities including
where the provider and patient are located during the video visit, where
the medication is received in the mail, where it is taken (which can
possibly be multiple locations for the two different drugs), and where
the pregnancy tissue is expelled.
It is possible that the Supreme Court and lower courts reach a
consistent rule despite these varying interests and hold that these laws
are always permissible or always prohibited. But it is much more likely
that some combination of the scenarios listed above would strike some
judges as appropriate and others as going too far, whether because of
a sense of fundamental fairness,189 the constitutional theories already
discussed in this section, or other constitutional concerns.190 Given the
underdeveloped and contested jurisprudence, the competing
fundamental constitutional principles involved, and the complex web
of factual scenarios that could possibly arise, the post-Roe judiciary will
soon be mired in interjurisdictional complexities that will make the
workability of the previous era look simple in comparison.
D. Can a State Insulate Providers From Out-of-State Prosecutions?
So far, this section has explored the difficult legal issues that
arise when antiabortion states attempt to apply their laws beyond state
borders. However, antiabortion states are not alone in thinking about
extraterritoriality after Roe. Abortion-supportive states have been
exploring ways to thwart antiabortion states from applying their laws
to abortions that occur within the abortion-supportive states. Since the
online posting of the first draft of this article,191 Massachusetts has
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981).
This might include concerns over minimum contacts from personal jurisdiction
doctrine, see Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310, or other the impact on other areas of law. See
Brief of Firearms Policy Coalition as Amicus Curiae in Support of Granting
Certiorari, Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, __ F.Supp.3d __ (W.D. Tex. 2021)
(No. 21-463), 2021 WL 3821062.
191 Some of the state efforts attempting to accomplish the protection described in
this section have happened independent of this Article, such as the work of the
California Future of Abortion Council. But others of these efforts have been in
response to work we have done in exploring how our proposals might be
implemented. The three of us have been actively involved in consulting with
legislators and advocates in many different states on protecting abortion care from
out-of-state legal action. Thus, the first draft of this Article we posted to SSRN in
early February 2022 spoke of these efforts as possibilities; now, at the point of
189
190
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passed the most comprehensive legislation, often referred to as an
interstate shield law, with Connecticut, New York, Delaware, and New
Jersey offering a panoply of protections as well.192 California, Illinois,
and the District of Columbia have pending bills addressing the issue.193
And governors of twelve states (California, Colorado, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington) have issued
executive orders following Dobbs that accomplish some of the goals
discussed here.194 This section explores several avenues by which states
can blunt the force of antiabortion states’ extraterritorial reach.
Importantly, each of these interventions would strike at the heart of
basic, fundamental principles of law in our federalist system—
interstate comity and cooperation. And none of them would protect
the patients and helpers who stay in, or return to, an antiabortion state
if a law targets their conduct.
With these risks in mind, an abortion-supportive state could
nevertheless protect its providers’ licenses and malpractice insurance
rates. Ever since SB8 took effect in September 2021, some have
wondered why Texas abortion providers have not engaged in civil
disobedience and provided abortions after six weeks that violate the
law.195 The answer is not just the risk of being forced to pay the $10,000
(or more) bounty. Texas abortion providers, many of whom also
practice other areas of medicine or provide abortions in other states,
also fear losing their medical licenses and facing cost-prohibitive
malpractice insurance rates.196 Lawsuits and complaints in which
providers are named as defendants typically are reported to their

finalizing this Article for publication, we can point to concrete laws and executive
orders that have been passed and bills that have been introduced, many – in part at
least – because of our work.
192 H.B. 5090, 192nd Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2022); H.B. 455, 151st Gen. Assem. (Del.
2022); S. 2642, 220th Leg. (NJ 2022); S2633, 220th Leg. (NJ 2022); Pub. Act No.
22-19 (Conn. 2022); S. 9039A, 2021-2022 Leg. Sess. (NY); A. 9687B, 2021-2022
Leg. Sess. (NY); A. 9718B, 2021-2022 Leg. Sess. (NY); A. 9818A, 2021-2022 Leg.
Sess. (NY); S. 9077A, 2021-2022 Leg. Sess. (NY); S. 9384A, 2021-2022 Leg. Sess.
(NY).
193 See H.B. 1464, 102nd Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2022); B. 24-0808 (D.C. 2022); B. 240726 (D.C. 2022).
194 E.O. N-12-22 (Cal. 2022); D. 2022-032 (Colo. 2022); E.O. 4 (Maine 2022); E.O.
600 (Mass. 2022); E.O. 2022-4 (Mich. 2022); E.O. 22-16 (Minn. 2022); E.O. 202208 (Nev. 2022); E.O. 2022-107 (N.M. 2022); E.O. 263 (N.C. 2022); E.O. 2022-01
(Pa. 2022); E.O. 22-28 (R.I. 2022); D. 22-12 (Wash. 2022).
195 Alexi Pfeffer-Gillett, Civil Disobedience in the Face of Texas’s Abortion Ban, 106
MINN. L. REV. 203 (2021).
196 United States’ Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order or
Preliminary Injunction, United States v. Texas, __ F. Supp.3d __, 2021 WL
4593319 (W.D. Tex. 2021), at 11,
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21062495/9-14-21-us-motion-for-tropi-texas-sb8.pdf.
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licensing bodies and insurers.197 In this context, that means if an
antiabortion state tries to impose criminal or civil liability on an
abortion provider for providing an abortion to someone from another
state that was legal in the provider’s state, that prosecution or lawsuit
could be reported to the provider’s licensing board, which typically has
broad discretion in governing provider ethics and standards of
conduct.198 Being named as a defendant too many times or being
subject to a disciplinary investigation, even if the provider ultimately
prevails, could result in licensure suspension, high malpractice
insurance costs, and reputational damage, given that lawsuits are
publicly available and figure into ratings of physician competence.199
These effects threaten providers’ ability to practice medicine and
support themselves and their families.
To prevent this, an abortion-supportive state can pass
legislation that prohibits its medical boards and in-state malpractice
insurance companies from taking any adverse action against providers
who face out-of-state legal consequences for assisting out-of-state
patients. This would not be a blanket immunity for abortion providers
but rather a targeted protection applicable to out-of-state
investigations, disciplinary actions, lawsuits, or prosecutions arising
from abortions performed in compliance with the home state’s law.
Several of the shield laws and executive orders offer this protection to
abortion providers.200
Beyond this kind of professional insulation, abortionsupportive states might also attempt to thwart interstate investigations
and discovery, both civil and criminal, into the care provided in their
states for patients from other states. These investigations and
discovery attempts, even if they do not result in liability, could be used
to harass providers, chilling abortion provision on out-of-state
patients, and to gather evidence that is used to form the basis of an
extraterritorial lawsuit or prosecution. On the civil side, most states
have enacted some form of the Uniform Interstate Depositions and
Discovery Act which simplifies the process for litigants to take
See About Physician Discipline, How State Medical Boards Regulate Physicians
after Licensing, FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS (last visited July 30,
2022), https://www.fsmb.org/u.s.-medical-regulatory-trends-and-actions/u.s.medical-licensing-and-disciplinary-data/. Malpractice payments are reported to the
National Practitioner Data Bank, which is part of the HHS’s Health Resource and
Services Administration. Reporting Medical Malpractice Payments, NPDB,
https://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/guidebook/EMMPR.jsp.
198 Jaqueline Landess, State Medical Boards, Licensure, and Discipline in the United States,
17 FOCUS: AM. PSYCHIATRY PUBL. 337, 338 (2019) (summarizing the history of
state medical boards and their “broad discretion”).
199 See U.S. Medical Licensing and Disciplinary Data, FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL
BOARDS (last visited Feb. 3, 2022), https://www.fsmb.org/u.s.-medical-regulatorytrends-and-actions/u.s.-medical-licensing-and-disciplinary-data/.
200 See, e.g., H.B. 5090, 192nd Gen. Ct. at §§ 5, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 23 (Mass. 2022);
E.O. 2022-107 at ¶ 3 (N.M. 2022).
197
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depositions and engage in discovery with people from another state.201
The Act streamlines the process for an out-of-state court to enforce
the original state’s subpoena. On the criminal side, the Uniform Act to
Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal
Proceedings, a version of which every state has enacted, accomplishes
the same goal for witness summons in criminal cases.202 And even
before witnesses are called, police departments usually work with one
another across state lines via formal and informal cooperation
agreements.203
States could protect their providers from antiabortion state
investigations, lawsuits, and prosecutions by exempting abortion
providers from the interstate discovery and interstate witness
subpoena laws while also prohibiting state and local law enforcement
agencies from cooperating with other states’ investigations into
abortion-related crimes and lawsuits.204 As with the professional
disciplinary exemptions above, this would not be for any and all
abortions. Rather, it would apply only to abortions that are otherwise
legal in the provider’s state. And a state passing such an exemption or
waiver would not be able to protect the provider if she ever traveled
to the antiabortion state, where she would then be subject to that
state’s laws or a judgment entered in that state’s courts.205 This form of
protection, however, would prevent the courts of the provider’s home
state from enforcing these out-of-state subpoenas and discovery
requests and the law enforcement agencies of the provider’s home
state from becoming a cooperating arm of the antiabortion state’s
investigation apparatus. All of the shield laws so far include these
protections and several of the executive orders do as well.206
An abortion-supportive state could separately exempt abortion
providers from the state’s extradition law for legal abortions in the
provider’s home state. The Constitution requires states to extradite an
accused criminal who flees to that state.207 Thus, for instance, Illinois
Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act (2007), available at
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ash
x?DocumentFileKey=3900ce12-d2bd-cd09-4e4a-8ae173279559&forceDialog=0.
202 Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Within or Without a
State in Criminal Proceedings (1936), available at
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/pub/2006/Uniform_Act_to_Secure_the_Attendenc
e_of_Witnesses.pdf.
203 Bridget A. Fahey, Federalism By Contract, 129 YALE L.J. 2326 (2020).
204 The Full Faith and Credit Clause is “inapplicable to the enforcement of an outof-state court’s decision to issue a commission authorizing certain depositions and
a demand for document production” because it only applies to final judgments.
Barbara J. Van Arsdale, et al., Operation and Effect of Full Faith and Credit Clause,
Generally; Judgments, 16B Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 1024 (2022).
205 Moreover, if a default judgment is entered against a provider in another state,
creditors might try to collect on that judgment, creating a separate problem for the
provider.
206 See, e.g., Pub. Act No. 22-19 at §§ 3, 4 (Conn. 2022).
207 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
201
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cannot constitutionally refuse to extradite an Illinois provider who
travels to Kentucky, performs an illegal abortion there, and then goes
back to Illinois. However, the Constitution’s extradition clause does
not cover extradition of people who did not flee, meaning a state is not
constitutionally required to extradite an Illinois provider who never
stepped foot in Kentucky.208 Outside of constitutional requirements,
some states’ extradition laws permit or obligate the state to extradite
accused criminals, even if they have never been in the other state and
thus have not fled.209 An abortion-supportive could exempt providers
and others from these provisions so that the provider could perform
abortions pursuant to their home state laws for out-of-state patients
without fear of being extradited.210 The shield laws that have passed so
far exempt extradition in such cases, and almost all of the executive
orders declare that the governors will not use their discretion in this
context.211
Another concern that is spurring interstate protection is the
threat of out-of-state civil judgments under laws such as Texas’s SB8.212
Imagine an Illinois abortion provider, volunteer driver, funder, or
other helper assisting a Texas patient to obtain an abortion that is
contrary to SB8 (one that is past six weeks and performed by a Texaslicensed physician). Under that law, anyone could sue that Illinois
Hyatt v. People of State of N.Y. ex rel. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691, 709–13.
Constructive presence is not enough to qualify as a fleeing fugitive. In re Rowe, 423
N.E.2d 167, 171 (Ohio 1981) (requiring corporeal presence). Thus, an abortion
provider who uses video conferencing to communicate with a patient in an
antiabortion state will not have been considered to have been present in that state
because, even though the video reached into the state, the provider’s physical
presence was not. This means the Constitutional requirement of extradition does
not apply. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 Univ. Chic. L. Rev. 1199,
1220 (1990) (“[A] person who in State A transmits information flows that appear in
and constitute a crime in State B will not likely be subject to extradition to State B
under these provisions. This is because the extradition obligation only extends to
fugitives who have fled State B, and these terms have long been limited to persons
who were physically present in the demanding state at the time of the crime’s
commission.”).
209 Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA); see, e.g., CONN. STAT. § 54-162
(“even though the accused was not in that state at the time of the commission of
the crime and has not fled therefrom”).
210 Though, if the other state issues a warrant for the provider’s arrest, the provider
would still face serious risks to their liberty because they might not be comfortable
traveling to any state that does not have the protections discussed in this section.
Thus, protection from extradition would help limit a provider’s risk, but in order to
completely eliminate the provider’s risk, the provider would need to limit their own
future travel.
211 See, e.g., Pub. Act No. 22-19 at § 5 (Conn. 2022); E.O. 2022-01 at ¶ 5 (Pa. 2022).
212 Texas’s SB8 creates civil liability for anyone who performs or aids and abortion
performed by a Texas-licensed provider. More recent SB8-style laws lacked any
requirement of a connection to the home state. For instance, the Oklahoma
copycat law creates civil liability for any abortion starting at conception without any
explicit connection to Oklahoma required by the text, creating a much wider
opening for these kinds of lawsuits.
208
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person for $10,000 or more.213 If a Texas court issues a final judgment
in that case finding the Illinois resident liable under SB8, the Full Faith
and Credit Clause would ordinarily require Illinois’ courts to enforce
that judgment.214 Individual Illinois litigants attempting to evade the
force of the judgment could try to take advantage of two recognized
exceptions to the Full Faith and Credit Clause by claiming the Texas
court had no personal jurisdiction over them215 or that SB8 is really a
penal law.216
But abortion-supportive states might chill the uptake of these
judgment enforcement actions by creating a cause of action against
anyone who interferes with lawful reproductive health care provision
or support. This new cause of action, such as the clawback provision
adopted by Connecticut and the other states with shield laws, would
recognize the out-of-state judgment, as the Constitution requires, but
subject the person seeking to enforce it to a new state tort claim for
interfering with reproductive health care provision that was lawful in
the abortion-supportive state.217 In passing such a law, states would
hope to thwart out-of-state enforcement actions in the first place
because people would fear bringing these actions into a state with this
new cause of action. Or, if there is an enforcement action in the
abortion-supportive state, the new cause of action would lead to the
negation of the financial impact of the out-of-state judgment by
forcing both parties to pay damages of the same amount to each other.
In addition, abortion-supportive states could protect
providers’ home addresses from public discovery out of concern that
they will be targeted by antiabortion extremists from afar now that they
are caring for an increased number of out-of-state patients.218 As part
of their shield bills, New York and Massachusetts expanded their
address confidentiality programs to include abortion providers and
patients.219
Finally, and much more controversially, states could attempt to
protect providers who are not only providing care to those traveling to
their state, but also to patients who stay where abortion is illegal by
mailing medication to them. Telehealth policies and the relevant
standard of care, which vary from state to state, define the location of
SB8, 87th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
215 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940) (“Where a judgment rendered in one
state is challenged in another, a want of jurisdiction over either the person or the
subject matter is of course open to inquiry.”).
216 Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229 (1970); The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 123
(1825) (“The Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another . . . .”); City of
Oakland v. Desert Outdoor Advert., Inc., 2676 P.3d 48, 49–50 (Nev. 2011).
217 Pub. Act No. 22-19 at § 1(b) (Conn. 2022).
218 See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6215 (West 2003); N.J. REV. STAT. § 47:4-2 (2019).
219 S. 9384A, 2021-2022 Leg. Sess. (NY); H.B. 5090, 192nd Gen. Ct. at §§ 2 (Mass.
2022).
213
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care as where the patient is. Thus, if the patient remains in Kentucky,
then the physician is acting illegally by practicing medicine without a
license in Kentucky, even if abortion via telehealth is legal in their
home state. Changing telehealth policies for abortion to define the
location of care as where the provider is located would mean the
provider’s home state would not consider the provider to be practicing
without a license or in violation of another state’s law. Such a rule
change would have significant consequences for the entire healthcare
ecosystem, and as a result, current proposals are limited to abortion
care. Even with that limitation, as section III.D notes, changing the
location of care has ripple effects for interstate licensure compacts and
model laws on telehealth. And, more significantly, abortion-supportive
states could not protect their providers from consequences in the state
where the patient is, which would consider the location of care
differently and thus the provider’s actions a violation of the state’s
abortion laws as well as its licensing laws. Thus, providers undertaking
explicit out-of-state telabortion care would likely become significant
targets. Though their home state’s shield law may protect them when
in their state, any travel outside the state may be high risk. As of now,
only the Massachusetts shield law has this form of protection.220
Beyond a provider who knowingly mails medication abortion
to a person in a state that bans it, questions of location—in practice—
will be much more unclear. The standard of care is to assume the
patient is where the provider is. As a result, there will be instances in
which a provider believes a patient is in an abortion-supportive state
when they are not. Though some states have statutory or regulatory
requirements that require providers ask for a patient’s residence or
location, some patients will lie or use work arounds like mail
forwarding. Even when patients physically travel to the abortion
supportive state, legal risks for providers increase if patients take
medication abortion home with them into an antiabortion state.
Inconsistent provider policies might emerge to respond to this
dilemma. Under Casey, state laws that required reporting residency
purported to serve the purpose of tracking abortion statistics—not to
police from where patients hailed. Under that reasoning, they, along
with other reporting requirements, continue to serve the purpose of
collecting abortion data but that purpose must be balanced against the
risk of extraterritorial punishment.
Moreover, abortion providers with the support of national
professional organizations could tailor their policies to meet patient
need and to comply with the law. They may offer different services to
out-of-state patients or consider having patients sign a waiver that
states, “I have been advised to take this medication in [the abortionsupportive state].” But herein lies another problem: waivers shift
liability to the patient, and if state laws begin to target patients, then
220

H.B. 5090, 192nd Gen. Ct. at lines 17-18, 74 (Mass. 2022).
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those individuals will bear all the costs. It also highlights an underanalyzed issue: how clinical practice will change to respond to threats
of cross-border liability and punishment, potentially adopting policies
that impose restrictions not required by their own state’s law.221
Even if the particular suggestions included in this section are
on constitutionally firm ground,222 there is no denying that each of
these proposals would threaten basic principles of comity between
states, possibly resulting in the breakdown of state-to-state relations
and ultimately retaliation. After all, if Illinois refuses to extradite an
abortion provider to Kentucky, will Kentucky retaliate and refuse to
extradite a gun dealer to Illinois? A state passing the shield provisions
discussed here would go a long way to protecting its providers and
increasing access for out-of-state patients who seek out those
providers, but would also intensify interstate conflict in a way that
could have unintended consequences for other areas of law as well as
the general fabric of our federalist form of government. As we argue
throughout this Article, these will be the inevitable effects of
overturning Roe.
III.

PREEMPTION, FEDERAL LAND, AND HEALTH POLICY

Interstate issues are not the only area that will cause deep
confusion: interaction between federal and state law will also be
complicated and in flux. Indeed, in the days following the Supreme
Court’s decision, the Biden Administration issued statements and
guidance promoting many of the theories mentioned below (some of
which have already been challenged in court), but more could be
done.223 This Part will explore how possible federal actions that might
be taken in the wake of Dobbs interact with—and possibly preempt—
state laws to the contrary. As with everything described already in this
Article, each move will face legal uncertainty and depend on political
mobilization. But with Roe overturned, the Biden Administration is
At the time of writing, some examples of emerging clinical practice seek to
minimize provider liability by contemplating a protocol that administers medication
abortion in one visit—over 6 to 8 hours—rather than over one to two days,
presumably so that the patient can complete an abortion at a clinic rather than take
pills at home. Another facility stopped providing medication abortion to out-ofstate patients. Email from Martha Fuller, President and CEO of Planned
Parenthood Montana, June 30, 2022 (on file with the authors).
222 The suggestions as described here are constitutionally sound. That does not
mean that every aspect of the various bills that have been introduced in different
states that mirror these suggestions is constitutionally sound as the particular
language of each provision must be assessed individually. Nor does it mean that a
motivated conservative judiciary might not change existing well-settled
constitutional principles in order to strike down these provisions.
223 We have publicly argued more should be done. David S. Cohen, Greer Donley,
& Rachel Rebouché, Joe Biden Can’t Save Roe v. Wade Alone. But He Can Do This,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/30/opinion/abortion-pills-biden.html.
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facing increasing pressure to use its power, however untested, to
protect abortion rights—and we offer avenues for how it can do so in
the immediate future.
The President cannot restore the right to abortion, but he can
use executive power to improve abortion access, even without
currently-stalemated legislative proposals.224 One possible tool at the
federal government’s disposal is preemption—the doctrine that federal
laws trump conflicting state laws. This Part discusses a few federal laws
that could partially preempt state abortion bans, the most significant
of which relates to the FDA’s regulatory authority over abortioninducing drugs. Asserting another form of power, the federal
government could take the novel approach of using its jurisdiction
over federal land within antiabortion states to insulate providers who
offer abortion care on that land. Complementing these strategies, and
in partnership with states, the executive branch could encourage
investment in telehealth and the adoption of interstate compacts that
will improve abortion care throughout the country. We begin with the
example of preemption and highlight throughout this section how the
scope of federal power—especially as it impacts antiabortion states—
will become critical to future abortion debates.
A. Federal Preemption
The U.S Constitution’s Supremacy Clause states that federal
law is the “supreme law of the land,” and trumps any state law to the
contrary.225 Thus, federal law could be a sword to poke holes in state
abortion bans; it could also be used as a defense to criminal
prosecution or civil liability. We start with the boldest preemption
argument: that states cannot ban mifepristone or regulate it more
harshly than the FDA. This would force states to permit medication
abortion through ten weeks. We conclude with additional preemption
arguments related to medically necessary abortions and reporting of
abortion-related crimes.
1. FDA’s Power Over Medication Abortion
Ever since the FDA approved medication abortion in 2000, it
has used its authority to restrict access to the drug in a variety of ways.
The FDA’s current regulation of mifepristone—the first medication in
the two-medication regimen for medical abortions—includes a Risk
Evaluation and Mitigation System (REMS). The imposition of a REMS
is a rare action that, by statute, can only be imposed if a REMS is
necessary to ensure that the drug’s benefits outweigh its risks.226
WHPA
U.S. Constitution, Art. IV.
226 Donley, supra note 54, at 22-36.
224
225
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Scholars have argued that the FDA’s use of the REMS for
mifepristone is unnecessary and contrary to the REMS statute, “unduly
burdens” access to the drug.227
The FDA’s current REMS, which now reflects a recent policy
change that clears the way for virtual care, has the following
requirements: (1) only certified providers can prescribe the drug, (2)
patients must sign a Patient Agreement Form, and (3) only certified
providers or certified pharmacies can dispense the drug.228 In the
process of revising the REMS numerous times over the past decade,
the FDA has made specific scientific findings about the drug’s safety
and efficacy. On the basis of these findings, in 2016, the agency
removed its earlier requirements that patients consume the drug inperson, allowing patients to take the pills at home after picking them
up at a healthcare facility.229 It removed the requirement that only
physicians could prescribe the drug, allowing physician assistants and
nurse practitioners to prescribe as well.230 It approved the drug’s use
through the tenth week of pregnancy, beyond the seventh week, as it
had previously determined.231 And finally, in December 2021, the
agency lifted the REMS provision that forced patients to pick up the
medication at a healthcare facility, paving the way for abortion via
telehealth with medication delivered through the mail.232
Various state laws conflict with these determinations. Up until
and even after Dobbs, nineteen states require a physician to be present
upon delivery of medication abortion, thus rendering completely
remote abortion impossible.233 State legislation that requires in-person
visits for counseling or ultrasounds preclude a wholly remote process.
Moreover, thirty-two states only allow physicians to prescribe
medication abortion, even though the FDA found it safe for nonphysician providers to prescribe it.234 Many states, like Mississippi, also
have required patients to consume the drug in the presence of a
provider—i.e., they cannot take the drug at home. And in September
Id.
Mifeprex (mifepristone) Information, supra note 55.
229 CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, APPLICATION NUMBER
020687ORIG1S020, SUMMARY REVIEW FOR REGULATORY ACTION 17 (Mar. 29,
2016),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2016/020687Orig1s020Su
mR.pdf.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Mifeprex (mifepristone) Information, supra note 55.
233 Medication Abortion, supra note 18. Ten states also have statutes that explicitly ban
the use of telemedicine for abortion even though existing in-person requirements
accomplish the same end; state courts in two of those states have enjoined the inperson requirement. See Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Iowa Bd. of Med.,
865 N.W.2d 252, 269 (Iowa 2015); Carrie N. Baker, Advocates Cheer FDA Review of
Abortion Pill Restrictions, MS. MAG., May 11, 2021 (describing the Ohio law and state
court injunction).
234 Medication Abortion, supra note 1718.
227
228
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2021, Texas enacted a law making it illegal to use medication abortion
after the first seven weeks of pregnancy, even though the drug has
been approved for used through the tenth week of pregnancy.235 Some
of these laws have been on the books for decades, but until very
recently, had never been challenged for contradicting the FDA’s
regulation. But there are deeper incentives now that Roe has been
overturned to challenge these laws under preemption doctrines,
especially given that the antiabortion movement has been focused in
recent years on hampering access to abortion pills. 236 Though many of
the laws that specifically target medication abortion will be subsumed
by a state’s general abortion ban, not all will. For instance,
Pennsylvania is not expected to ban abortion, but it still requires
abortion providers to be physicians.237
There is a strong, though legally uncertain, argument that
federal law preempts these state restrictions on medication abortion; it
could even preempt general abortion bans, though that is even more
uncertain. As noted, the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause
establishes that when state and federal laws conflict, the federal law
will preempt state law.238 For this reason, if Congress were to pass the
Women’s Health Protection Act,239 or a similar law that created a
federal right to abortion, this federal law would preempt state abortion
bans. However, given the current stalemate in the Senate, the prospects
of a new federal law protecting abortion rights are slim to none in the
short term. But if the FDA’s regulation of medication abortion
preempts state restrictions on the pills or, more broadly, state laws that
ban all abortion, medication abortion as approved by the FDA would
be available in all fifty states.
The crux of any preemption argument is Congressional
purpose, which “is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption
case.”240 Congress can express this preemptive purpose explicitly or
implicitly, but in the context of federal preemption of state drug law,
plaintiffs must rely on implied preemption theories. Congress

See S.B. 4, Sess. 87(2) (Tex. 2021).
See, e.g., Cheryl Sullenger, The Status of American Abortion Facilities: Telemedicine’s
Impact in 2021, OPERATION RESCUE (Jan. 11, 2022),
https://www.operationrescue.org/archives/the-status-of-american-abortionfacilities-telemedicines-impact-in-2021; Veronica Stracqualursi, South Dakota Places
Further Restrictions on Medication Abortions, CNN (Jan. 8, 2022),
https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/08/politics/south-dakota-medicationabortions/index.html.
237 https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/ConsumerAbortion-QA-FINAL-6-30-22.pdf.
238 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
239 WHPA cite.
240 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
235
236
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expressly preempted state law when it created legislation that governed
medical devices but never did so for pharmaceuticals.241
Implied preemption of state law occurs in a few contexts: when
it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law (impossibility
preemption),242 when a state law would frustrate the purpose
underlying federal law (obstacle preemption),243 or when federal law
entirely occupies a field (field preemption).244 The former two types of
implied preemption—impossibility and obstacle preemption, together
considered conflict preemption—are more commonly relied upon to
prove preemption in the context of federal drug law.245 The Supreme
Court has considered whether the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA), and the regulatory scheme implementing it, preempts state
law a few times in the past decade—all using conflict preemption
theories. Recent decisions increasingly have accepted the preemptive
force of FDA rules.
The framing of Congressional purpose is key to an obstacle
preemption theory. In the context of state regulation of mifepristone,
there are three primary purposes: (1) Congress envisioned the FDA’s
role, in part, as protecting patient access to safe and effective drugs,
and thus state laws that restrict access thwart this purpose; (2)
Congress created the FDA with the purpose of establishing a
nationally uniform, definitive, and rigorous drug approval system, and
thus state laws creating variation thwart that purpose; and (3) Congress
created the REMS program specifically so that the FDA could balance
the important goals associated with drug safety and drug access, and
thus states laws that balance these goals differently for drugs subject to
a REMS thwart this purpose. Each of these congressional purposes are
supported either by statutory text or legislative history.
For a preemption challenge state laws that regulate
mifepristone more harshly than the FDA—laws that still might be
controlling in some states after Roe, such as physician-only mandates—
the third purpose is most relevant because states laws directly conflict
with the FDA’s determinations under the REMS. Indeed, it is the
FDA’s imposition of a REMS—and the extra control that comes with
it—that strengthens a preemption argument. When Congress created
the REMS program in 2007, it gave the FDA the ability to impose
additional controls on certain approved drugs, but in doing so,
required the agency to use the least restrictive means of protecting the
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567; Patricia J. Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 IND. L.J.
845, 862 (2017).
242 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
243 Id.
244 Id. at 78.
245 Because the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (FDCA) does not disrupt the states’
ability to regulate drugs in certain confined contexts, like tort law or the practice of
medicine, the FDA may not presumptively occupy the entire field. Zettler, supra
note 222, at 859-62.
241
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public.246 The statute specifically said that the REMS may “not be
unduly burdensome on patient access to the drug.”247 Thus, in
imposing a REMS for mifepristone, the FDA has chosen to exercise
more control over the drug than it does for the 95% of approved drugs
that are not subject to a REMS.248 And in exercising that control, it has
had to justify its decisions with evidence that balanced safety and
efficacy with access.
State laws that overregulate medication abortion rest on
scientific conclusions that are directly at odds with those that Congress
required the FDA to make when issuing a REMS. As noted, the FDA
has specifically considered and rendered judgment about whether
medication abortion can be safely and effectively (1) prescribed by
non-physician providers;249 (2) used through ten weeks of pregnancy;250
(3) consumed at home;251 and (4) dispensed by mail or certified
pharmacy.252 Thus, in addition to bans on all abortion, which we
discuss below, any state laws that remain after Dobbs that require
physician prescribing, limit the length of use, require in-person pick up
or consumption, ban the use of telehealth, or prohibit mailing
medication abortion conflict directly with the agency’s evidence-based
conclusions required by the REMS statute.253 Courts have preempted
state laws that are directly at odds with the FDA’s determinations in
other contexts. For instance, state tort laws are preempted when they
require risk disclosures that the FDA has specifically considered and
The statute requires that the ETASU be “commensurate with the specific
serious risk listed in the labeling of the drug,” “not be unduly burdensome on
patient access to the drug, considering in particular . . . patients who have difficulty
accessing health care (such as patients in rural or medically underserved areas),”
and “conform with elements to assure safe use for other drugs with similar, serious
risks.” 21 U.S.C. § 355–1(f)(2). The statute also required the agency “to the extent
practicable . . . minimize the burden on the healthcare delivery system.” 21 U.S.C.
§ 355–1(f)(2).
247 21 U.S.C. § 355–1(f)(2).
248 Donley, supra note 54, at 31.
249 CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 229, at 17.
(“healthcare providers other than physicians can effectively and safely provide
abortion services, provided that they meet the requirements for certification
described in the REMS.”).
250 Id. at 9 (“the data and information reviewed constitute substantial evidence to
support the proposed dosing regimen . . . for pregnancy termination through 70
days [or ten weeks] gestation.”).
251 Id. at 15 (“there is no clinical reason to restrict the location in which misoprostol
may be taken. . . . Given the fact that the onset of cramping and bleeding occurs
rapidly (i.e., generally within 2 hours) after misoprostol dosing, allowing dosing at
home increases the chance that the woman will be in an appropriate and safe
location when the process begins.”).
252 FDA Letter, supra note 59 (“We have concluded that mifepristone will remain
safe and effective for medical abortion if the in- person dispensing requirement is
removed, provided all the other requirements of the REMS are met and pharmacy
certification is added.”).
253 It is worth noting that the FDA reviewed and reiterated its scientific conclusions
from 2016 in 2021. Id.
246
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rejected as not necessary.254 This REMS-focused purpose is narrower
than what we describe below and might be less likely to have
unintended consequences on other state public health efforts related
to other FDA-regulated products, like tobacco.
Viewed through the different Congressional purpose of drug
accessibility, there is case law suggesting that states cannot regulate
FDA-approved drugs in a way that would remove them from the
market or make them less accessible. One such case in the District of
Massachusetts invalidated a state’s attempt to regulate a newly
approved and controversial opioid, Zohydro, more harshly than the
FDA.255 Of particular concern was the state requirement that a
prescribing physician verify “that other pain management treatments
have failed.”256 The court evaluated “whether the regulations prevent
the accomplishment of the FDA’s objective that safe and effective
drugs be available to the public.”257 The judge preliminarily enjoined
the regulation, finding the plaintiffs likely to succeed on their
preemption theory because “if the Commonwealth interprets its
regulation to make Zohydro a last-resort opioid, it undeniably makes
Zohydro less available.”258 When the state changed the requirement to
only require a showing that other pain-management treatments were
“inadequate,” mimicking the FDA-approved label, the court upheld
the law.259 Based on this reasoning, a state law that makes a drug less
accessible than the FDA frustrates Congress’s purpose in ensuring the
accessibility of safe and effective drugs.
Some scholars have been skeptical that one of Congress’s
purposes in creating the national drug review system was to make
approved drugs accessible (instead of just safe and effective).260
However, this accessibility purpose is clearly incorporated into the
REMS statute,261 suggesting that congressional purpose would be
frustrated if states attempt to ban a drug that the FDA regulates
See e.g., Seufert v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., 187 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1175-77
(S.D. Cal. 2016) (finding that a state duty-to-warn case was preempted because the
manufacturer could not have been required to warn patients of a risk that the FDA
has specifically concluded did not exist); In re Zofran (Ondansetron) Prod. Liab.
Litig., No. 1:15-MD-2657-FDS, 2021 WL 2209871, at *33 (D. Mass. June 1, 2021)
(same).
255 Its own advisory committee had recommended against approving Zohydro on
the ground that there was no “need for a new form of one of most widely abused
prescription drugs in the United States,” but the FDA nevertheless approved it. In
re Zofran, at 3, n.9.
256 Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. CIV.A. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 3339610, at *1
(D. Mass. July 8, 2014), vacated in part, No. CIV.A. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL
4273251 (D. Mass. Aug. 28, 2014).
257 Id. at *4.
258 Id.
259 Zogenix, Inc., 2014 WL 3339610, at *3.
260 See Lars Noah, State Affronts to Federal Primacy in the Licensure of Pharmaceutical
Products, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 8-12 (2016).
261 21 U.S.C. 355-1.
254
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through the REMS process. Professor Patti Zettler agrees that in the
context of a REMS, the preemption argument is stronger because
“Congress has arguably required the FDA to do a complex balancing
of numerous considerations, both in determining whether a REMS is
necessary at all, and in determining what to include in a REMS when
one is needed.”262 As a result, any additional restrictions might “pose
an obstacle to the FDA’s responsibility to satisfy these Congressional
objectives.”263 Recently, Zettler and Ameet Sarpatwari applied this line
of reasoning to medication abortion:
While the mifepristone REMS remains in place, a
strong case can be made that state-required measures
that go beyond the conditions in the REMS . . . upset
the complex balancing of safety and burdens on the
health care system that federal law requires of the FDA
when it imposes a REMS like the one for
mifepristone.264
They note that these laws are troubling when they are “are grounded
in drug-safety arguments,” because they encroach on the FDA’s clear
authority.265
One effort to test these theories began before the Dobbs
decision. In 2020, mifepristone’s generic manufacturer, GenBioPro,
recently sued Mississippi on preemption grounds. Mississippi law
requires physicians to physically examine a patient prior to offering
medication abortion and for patients to ingest the medication “in the
same room and in the physical presence of the physician who gave,
sold, dispensed or otherwise provided or prescribed the drug or
chemical to the patient.”266 GenBioPro argued that Mississippi’s law,
which is far stricter than the current REMS, is preempted because it is
“an impermissible effort by Mississippi to establish its own drug
approval policy and directly regulate the availability of drugs within the
state.”267 In short, GenBioPro argues that the FDA’s actions preempt
state efforts to restrict dispensation of mifepristone.268 (In July 2022,
GenBioPro moved to amend the complaint to challenge Mississippi’s
general abortion ban, discussed below.269) Thus far, the FDA has not
Zettler, supra note 222, at 875.
Id.
264 Patricia J. Zettler & Ameet Sarpatwari, State Restrictions on Mifepristone Access—The
Case for Federal Preemption, NEW ENG. J. MED. (Jan. 12, 2022),
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2118696.
265 Id.
266 Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-107(2)-(3).
267 Brief of Plaintiffs GenBioPro at 27, Genbiopro, Inc. v. Dobbs, (No. CV TDC20-652), 2020 WL 2771735 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 9, 2020).
268 Id. at 28. In addition, GenBioPro argues that the Mississippi statute is a
“significant burden on interstate commence because [it] interferes with the FDA’s
national and uniform system of regulation,” in violation of the Commerce Clause.
269 GENBIOPRO, INC.’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS
262
263
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weighed in on the case, but the agency could intervene as amici or work
with the Department of Justice to assert its authority in its own
litigation.270
Antiabortion states will resist these efforts, and one of their
primary arguments will be that states have the sole authority to regulate
the practice of medicine, which includes what drugs providers may
prescribe.271 As scholars have explained, “courts, lawmakers, and the
FDA itself have long opined that state jurisdiction is reserved for
medical practice—the activities of physicians and other health care
professionals—and federal jurisdiction for medical products, including
drugs.”272 However, the practice-of-medicine defense was raised and
rejected in the Zohydro litigation.273 Professor Zettler contends that
the Zohydro litigation is one of many recent examples showing that
“the distinction between regulating medical practice and medical
products is nebulous” and “the FDA’s preemptive reach can extend
into medical practice regulation in certain circumstances.”274 Zettler
suggests that if the state is attempting to regulate drugs—even if it does
so through the smokescreen of provider conduct—it is attempting to
displace federal law and frustrate congressional purpose.275
And that raises the much more complex question: can FDA
regulations preempt a state’s general ban on abortion?276 Returning to
the purpose of the FDA, its most famous and uncontested role is to
act as a gatekeeper. To earn the right to sell a drug product,
manufacturers must produce years, if not decades, of expensive, highquality research proving that the drug is safe and effective.277 If they
are successful, they can sell their product in every state; if unsuccessful,

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT, Genbiopro, Inc.
v. Dobbs, Docket No. 3:20-cv-00652 (S.D. Miss. July 21, 2022)
270 See Press Release, Dept. of Just., Justice Department Files Preemption Lawsuit
Against the State of California to Stop Interference with Federal Immigration
Authorities (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmentfiles-preemption-lawsuit-against-state-california-stop-interference (describing a
lawsuit filed to invalidate a state law that the federal government viewed as
preempted).
271 Zettler, supra note 222, at 869 n.160.
272 Id. at 849.
273 Id. at 872.
274 Id. at 886.
275 Id. at 887.
276 In addition to general abortion bans, some states have introduced laws that
would simply ban mifepristone. The preemption argument in the context of these
laws would be strong and nearly identical to the Zohydro litigation.
277 See Cost of Clinical Trials For New Drug FDA Approval, JOHNS HOPKINS (Sept. 24,
2018), https://publichealth.jhu.edu/2018/cost-of-clinical-trials-for-new-drugFDA-approval-are-fraction-of-total-tab (noting that the cost of developing an
individual drug is only around $19 million on average, but that number balloons to
over a billion dollars when taking into account failed drugs).
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they cannot sell their product anywhere.278 When a state bans abortion,
it bans the sale of an FDA-approved drug. And whether a state has the
authority to do that has been considered peripherally by the Supreme
Court and directly by a lower court in a series of cases.
In 2009, the Court held in Wyeth v. Levine that the FDA’s
regulatory scheme did not preempt state tort laws that would have
required greater drug warnings than those required by the FDA.279
There, the Court rejected the impossibility preemption theory because
it was not impossible for the brand name manufacturer to comply with
both state and federal law—FDA regulation allowed the manufacturer
to change their drug labels to be more protective, though not less,
without the FDA’s approval.280 The Court also rejected an obstacle
preemption argument, finding that Congress’s “silence on the issue,
coupled with its awareness of the prevalence of state tort litigation, is
powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be
the exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and effectiveness.”281
Though the FDA had stated in a piece of regulatory preamble that its
labeling regulations preempt state tort laws, the Court refused to defer
to the agency’s conclusions regarding preemption because its
determination was conclusory, procedurally defective, and contrary to
its past position.282
But two years later, the Court distinguished Wyeth in the
context of generic drugs. In PLIVA v. Mensing, the Court held that
because generic drugs are required to adhere to the brand drug’s
labeling—and companies are unable to make a drug’s label more
stringent without departing from the brand label—it would be
impossible for a generic drug company to change their labels to avoid
a failure-to-warn tort action, while also remaining compliant with FDA
law.283 In this case, a plurality of the Court seemed to shift their
understanding of preemption doctrine to recognize implied invalidation
of state law, concluding that courts “should not distort federal law to
accommodate conflicting state law.”284 Thus, in a case with very similar
facts to Wyeth, the Court found that federal drug law preempted state
failure-to-warn tort actions against generic manufacturers.285 Then, in
Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, in 2013, the Supreme Court reiterated that
conclusion by preempting a design defect tort action against a generic

See FDA Activities to Remove Unapproved Drugs from the Market, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (last updated June 2, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/enforcementactivities-fda/fda-activities-remove-unapproved-drugs-market.
279 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 569.
280 Id. at 569-72.
281 Id. at 575.
282 Id. at 576-79.
283 PLIVA Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 604 (2011).
284 Id. at 622.
285 Id.
278
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manufacturer on the ground that a generic manufacturer similarly
cannot alter the composition of a drug.286
Importantly, in both Mensing and Bartlett, which relied on
impossibility preemption, the tort plaintiffs argued that the
manufacturer could comply with both state and federal law by refusing
to sell their product in those states. The Court rejected this argument
explicitly in Bartlett: “We reject this ‘stop-selling’ rationale as
incompatible with our pre-emption jurisprudence. Our pre-emption
cases presume that an actor seeking to satisfy both his federal- and
state-law obligations is not required to cease acting altogether in order
to avoid liability.”287 In fact, the Court went so far as to say that
requiring a manufacturer to remove a product from a state market
would render the entire doctrine of impossibility preemption
meaningless.288 Thus, the Supreme Court implied in Mensing and Barrett
that states cannot ban FDA-approved drugs: “if the relatively more
attenuated command of design defect scrutiny in tort law created an
actual conflict with federal law governing FDA-approved drugs, then
surely an outright sales prohibition imposed by state officials would do
so.”289 Notably, it was the conservative justices who tend to be more
sympathetic to business interests that were in the majority.
There is very little case law directly evaluating whether a state
can ban an FDA-approved drug, mainly because states rarely attempt
it. The most analogous case to date is an earlier iteration of the same
District of Massachusetts case discussed above. Before Massachusetts
crafted extra restrictions for Zohydro, it first banned the drug entirely,
and the court considered whether that ban was invalid under an
obstacle preemption theory.290 In issuing a preliminary injunction, the
District of Massachusetts concluded that the state was likely to succeed
at showing that the ban would frustrate Congress’s purpose in ensuring
that drugs are accessible, not only safe and effective: “If the
Commonwealth were able to countermand the FDA’s determinations
[on safety and efficacy] and substitute its own requirements, it would
undermine the FDA’s ability to make drugs available to promote and
Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 475 (2013).
Id. at 487.
288 Id. at 488.
289 Noah, supra note 260, at 35.
290 Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696, at *2 (D.
Mass. Apr. 15, 2014). The manufacturer also brought a Dormant Commerce Clause
challenge, which the judge rejected. Zogenix, Inc. v. Baker, No. CIV.A. 14-11689RWZ, 2015 WL 1206354, at *7 (D. Mass. Mar. 17, 2015). The court found that the
state interest in “promoting public health and safety” outweighed these interstate
commerce effects: “It does not contravene the dormant commerce clause for a
state merely to regulate the distribution within its borders of a product that travels
in interstate commerce.” Id. The court did admit that “Zohydro’s theory about
national pharmacies refusing to dispense Zohydro may be sufficient to show a
burden on interstate commerce,” but found the plaintiff’s allegations too
speculative. Id.
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protect the public health.”291 The court distinguished Wyeth by noting
that there, the Supreme Court “assumed the availability of the drug at
issue.”292
Though many FDA law scholars agree that a state ban of an
FDA-approved drug would be preempted293—and to be clear, some
states have introduced laws that directly prohibit the dispensation or
use of medication abortion294—some scholars have disagreed with the
district court’s reasoning, which emphasized that one of the FDA’s
purposes was to ensure that drugs are accessible.295 Though there is
certainly some statutory support for the proposition that Congress
wanted the FDA to safeguard drug safety, efficacy, and access, outside
the context of a REMS, the agency’s primary role as a gatekeeper cuts
against this view. Professor Lars Noah has argued, for instance, that
the agency typically has no say over whether pharmaceutical companies
charge reasonable prices or remove important, but unprofitable, drugs
from the market—both of which impede access.296 To the extent the
FDA has any role in promoting access to drugs, it is secondary to its
role in protecting patients from unsafe or ineffective drugs. Instead,
Noah suggests that a state ban on an FDA-approved drug likely
frustrates a different Congressional purpose: the creation of a uniform,
national, definitive judgment about drug safety and efficacy. When
seen through this lens, a state ban is problematic because it frustrates
the uniformity promised by a national drug review system; it revokes
the promise of a national market for drugs that meet the demands of
an onerous review process. Certainly, if a state can ban a drug—either
directly or indirectly—it frustrates the purpose of having one uniform
system of drug approval. And pharmaceutical companies would be
shocked to learn that states can just ban products they don’t like after
they invested tens of millions of dollars in the FDA review system.
Consumer safety often is offered as a reason to oppose
preemption in the context of state efforts to regulate drugs.297 After
all, the FDA regulates all sorts of products, such as tobacco, and states
have often tried innovative approaches to protect their citizen’s health.
Zogenix, Inc., 2014 WL 1454696, at *2.
Id.
293 See Noah, supra note 241, at 8-12; Zettler, supra note 222, at 870-78.
294 Christine Vescal, As Abortion Pills Take Off, Some States Move to Curb Them, PEW
TRUST, March 16, 2022, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2022/03/16/as-abortion-pills-take-off-some-states-moveto-curb-them (“Outright bans on dispensing or using the FDA-approved
medications have been proposed in Alabama, Arizona, Iowa, South Dakota,
Illinois, Washington and Wyoming.”).
295 Noah, supra note 241, at 8-12.
296 Id.
297 For years, liberal scholars have opposed preemption challenges based on food
and drug law because they were often brought by pharmaceutical and tobacco
companies who were attempting to invalidate state efforts to require additional
warnings or impose stricter safety regulations.
291
292
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There is the fear that a win in this context would have collateral
consequences on state efforts to protect health and safety. But
medication abortion’s excellent safety record and unique regulatory
history challenge this critique.298 Because, though the dissenters in
Bartlett focused on the state interest in protecting patients, they made
clear that the particulars of the drug at issue matter. For instance,
Justice Breyer’s dissent, which was joined by Justice Kagan, noted that
“the more medically valuable the drug, the less likely Congress
intended to permit a State to drive it from the marketplace.”299 And
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent suggested that an obstacle preemption
framework, instead of impossibility preemption, would help the Court
better account for safety by “allow[ing] the Court to consider evidence
about whether Congress intended the FDA to make an optimal safety
determination and set a maximum safety standard (in which case state
tort law would undermine the purpose) rather than a minimal safety
threshold (in which case state tort law could supplement it).”300 Justice
Sotomayor’s comments are apt in the context of the REMS program,
where the statute envisions not just a regulatory floor, but a ceiling that
accounts for patient access.301 Mifepristone’s strong safety profile and
regulation under a REMS makes the preemption arguments stronger
than past cases.302 We are not blind to concerns that preemption for
abortion inducing drugs could have effects that impact other state
regulation of health products. But the industry already is bringing, and
winning, these lawsuits, so courts will decide these questions
regardless.
There are important counterarguments to the preemption
theory in the context of general abortion bans.303 First, states will argue
that their laws do not ban medication abortion drugs entirely because
they could be sold and used for other uses.304 Misoprostol, in particular,
is used for a variety of obstetric purposes, including inducing labor and

Donley, supra note 54, at 14-22.
Mensing, 564 U.S. at 494 (Beyer, J., dissenting).
300 Id. at 514-15 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
301 Of note, the mifepristone REMS required the FDA to make an on-the-record
agency determination related to risk, benefit, and access that the Court found
missing in Wyeth. Jennifer L. Bragg & Maya P. Florence, Life with A Rems: Challenges
and Opportunities, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 269, 278 (2010).
302 Zettler & Sarpatwari, supra note 245, at 3 (“preemption challenges to state
mifepristone restrictions should not be understood as risking the future viability of
public health federalism more broadly.”).
303 One challenge not mentioned above is that though the practice-product
distinction may be less stark than previously assumed, courts might also be more
willing to find that a state’s regulation or prohibition of all abortion (even
procedure-based abortion) to more obviously fit a practice-of-medicine regulation
reserved for the states than a ban on an FDA-approved product. This might be the
case, but the preemption challenge would not be to the whole law, but to the law’s
application over medication abortion.
304 Donley, supra note 54, at 32-33.
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treating miscarriage, and was originally approved to treat ulcers. Thus,
the ban would not be on a drug, but on a use of the drug.
This distinction may be less important than it initially appears.
The FDA has approved mifepristone only for abortion, and its
manufacturers are only legally allowed to market it for that one use.305
And though providers, as distinct from manufacturers, are generally
allowed to prescribe drugs off label, the REMS has made it almost
impossible for them to do so with mifepristone306—underscoring that
an abortion ban is a de facto ban on mifepristone.307 The drug company
would not be able to market its product at all in half the country. Recall
that the payoff at the end of the long, expensive drug approval process
is an assurance that manufacturers can sell their drug throughout the
country.308 Without that assurance, manufacturers would never invest
the time and money to complete the drug review process. In this way,
FDA approval “represent[s] more than simply federal permission to
market a pharmaceutical product; [it] amount[s] to licenses, which
qualify as a form of intangible property entitled to constitutional
recognition.”309 When a state bans the only use of an approved drug,
that state has thwarted the purpose of the FDA approval process by
banning the drug.
This argument is more complex with misoprostol given that
the drug manufacturer was never legally allowed to market the drug for
abortion, since that is an off-label use, and it could continue to market
the drug to treat ulcers.310 However, even with misoprostol, abortion
bans are affecting access to the drug for other uses. For instance, some
pharmacies have stopped dispensing misoprostol for any purpose in
states that ban abortion.311 Typically, pharmacies are not given any
information related to the use of the drug, so the pharmacist cannot
be sure whether the drug is being used for ulcers, miscarriage, or

86 Fed. Reg. 41383 (Aug. 2, 2021) (2021 Final Rule),
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/FR-2021-08-02/2021-15980/summary.
306 Donley, supra note 54, at 662 (arguing that the REMS burdens the use of the
drug for miscarriage management even though it is the most effective drug
treatment option for that use).
307 Id.
308 See discussion supra notes 308-11 and accompanying text.
309 Noah, supra note 260, at 32.
310 The preemption argument is also harder for misoprostol because it lacks a
REMS and therefore the arguments presented above that depend on the presence
of a REMS might be inapplicable. However, one could argue that misoprostol is
incorporated explicitly by reference into the mifepristone REMS because the
mifepristone use depends on its combination with misoprostol.
311 See Christina Cauterucci, Abortion Bans Are Already Messing Up Access to Other Vital
Meds, SLATE (May 24, 2022), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2022/05/abortion-texas-pharmacies-refusing-prescriptions-misoprostolmethotrexate.html.
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abortion. An abortion ban thus impedes access to abortion inducing
drugs for all uses.312
Second, states will argue that even if FDA regulations can
preempt state laws concerning public health, they cannot preempt state
laws concerning morality, which is outside the FDA’s purview and
within states’ historic police powers. Many state abortion laws are
justified on public health grounds, especially those that impose extra
hurdles in accessing medication abortion, but many general abortion
bans will likely be justified on moral grounds, like, to borrow a state
interest cited in Dobbs, “respect for preservation of prenatal life at all
stages of development.”313 Preemption is always anchored in
Congressional intent, so the argument would be that Congress did not
intend FDA’s reach to extend into states’ control of moral questions.
Courts will have to decide whether the purpose of the state statute
matters when the effect—the inability to sell an FDA-approved drug
in half the country—is the same. Certainly, it would violate the FDCA
if a state tried to permit the sale of a new drug treatment for its citizens
on moral grounds when the FDA refused to approve it, so it is not
clear why the opposite would not also violate the law.
The strongest counterargument is that the FDCA, setting out
the duties of the FDA, does not evince congressional intent for the
Secretary Becerra has issued a guidance document arguing that this pharmacy
conduct is illegal sex discrimination, but it is unclear whether it will have an effect.
HHS Issues Guidance to the Nation’s Retail Pharmacies Clarifying Their
Obligations to Ensure Access to Comprehensive Reproductive Health Care
Services (July 13, 2022), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2022/07/13/hhsissues-guidance-nations-retail-pharmacies-clarifying-their-obligations-ensure-accesscomprehensive-reproductive-health-care-services.html.
313 Dobbs, 547 U.S. __ (2022), slip op. at 78. One example sometimes raised is lifeending medications, which are FDA-approved drugs that are used off label to end a
person’s life. Physician aid in dying is banned in most states, potentially raising
many of the same issues. This example, however, is inapt given the agency’s
extensive history with life-ending drugs in the capital punishment context where it
has explicitly over the course of decades disclaimed any jurisdiction over the drugs.
Over the course of decades, the FDA has explicitly avoided wading into life-ending
medications. This avoidance was the subject of a Supreme Court case, Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) concerning drugs used for lethal injections. In 2012,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a permanent injunction
forcing the FDA to block the importation of drugs used for lethal injections that
were not sold in the U.S. Beaty v. FDA, 853 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2012). Finally
in 2019, the Office of Legal Counsel for the Department of Justice wrote a slip
opinion arguing that the FDA lacked jurisdiction over capital punishment drugs
because they could never be found safe or effective. WHETHER THE FOOD AND
DRUG ADMINISTRATION HAS JURISDICTION OVER ARTICLES INTENDED FOR USE
IN LAWFUL EXECUTIONS (May 3, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/file/1162686/download. Though the
analogy between physician aid in dying and lethal injection is not perfect, surely the
conclusion that the drugs cannot be safe or effective would apply to both
situations, undercutting any argument that the FDA has occupied the space or
preempted state regulation. If anything, the agency has gone out of its way to
suggest that it has no power in this space.
312
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FDA to regulate abortion. A similar argument was raised when the
FDA attempted to regulate tobacco products by claiming that nicotine
met the definition of a drug and that a cigarette was therefore a drug
delivery device. In Brown & Williamson, the Supreme Court rejected
that interpretation, holding that “we are confident that Congress could
not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political
significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”314 Brown & Williamson
is often pinpointed for the emergence of the “no-elephants-inmouseholes” doctrine—the concept that Congress does not hide huge,
politically-relevant policy decisions in the interstices of a statute.315 The
Court found it anomalous that the FDCA could be interpreted to
regulate (maybe even ban) a product, cigarettes, that were so politically
and economically important to states when Congress never considered
or debated that possibility when it passed the statute. One could
imagine the same type of analysis in the case of mifepristone. If
Congress wants to preempt any state action on abortion, the argument
goes, it must say so explicitly.
To the extent the FDA gets involved in such a lawsuit and
claims its interpretation is entitled to deference, a related doctrine—
the major questions exception—could likely be used to reject
deference.316 This doctrine states that courts should not defer to
agencies when their interpretation concerns a major economic or
political question.317 As part of its broader efforts to dismantle the
administrative state, the current Supreme Court has struck down many
important agency decisions in recent years relying on this doctrine,
including a case this term.318 “Under this body of law. . . given both
separation of powers principles and a practical understanding of
legislative intent, the agency must point to ‘clear congressional
authorization’ for the authority it claims.”319 This doctrine would
certainly be a large obstacle to the FDA claiming that it’s preemption
interpretation deserves deference because arguably, the agency is
“adopt[ing] a regulatory program that Congress had conspicuously
declined to enact itself.”320 However, the FDA need not be involved in
abortion preemption lawsuits. Indeed, if one of the drug
manufacturers brings suit and the FDA remains neutral, then
deference is not an issue in the case. The Court would decide the
statutory interpretation and Congressional purpose questions on its
own. The FDA’s involvement could divert attention from the drug
Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
159-60 (2000).
315 Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L.
REV. 19 (2010).
316 See Jonas J. Monast, Major Questions About the Major Questions Doctrine, 68 MICH. J.
ENVIR. & ADMIN. L. 445 (2016).
317 See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015).
318 West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, 597 U.S. ___ (2022).
319 Id. at 4.
320 Id. at 5.
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manufacturer’s claim and the business interests involved, allowing the
Court to opine on agency overstep instead of the preemption issue,
hampering the lawsuit more than helping it.
Though these related doctrines provide a much stronger
argument against preemption, they are not failproof. Unlike the
tobacco regulation in the Brown & Williamson era,321 the FDA has
authority to regulate mifepristone and has been closely regulating it for
decades. Its regulation of the product is not new or controversial—its
particular regulatory decisions might be, but not its ability to regulate.
Indeed, Brown & Williamson relied on the fact that the FDA had
previously denounced its ability to regulate tobacco products, while, in
the meantime, Congress had assumed that role.322 The opposite is true
in the case of medication abortion: the FDA has exercised sustained
control over medication abortion—even imposing a REMS so that it
could regulate the drug even more closely than 95% of the drugs it
approves—and Congress has done nothing to impede agency actions
and decisions.323 Quite the opposite: members of Congress routinely
issue letters to FDA about its regulation of this drug, never overruling
the FDA’s decision by statute or removing the FDA’s power to
regulate in this space. It is not using “vague language of a long-extant,
but rarely used, statute” to assert new authority, but continuing its
decades-long regulation of medication abortion.324
After the Dobbs decision, the Biden Administration appears to
have some level of support for this theory.325 The strongest statement
came from Attorney General Garland who said: “the FDA has
approved the use of the medication Mifepristone. States may not ban
Mifepristone based on disagreement with the FDA’s expert judgment
about its safety and efficacy.”326 Shortly thereafter, President Biden
signed an Executive Order directing HHS to take “additional action to
protect and expand access to abortion care, including access to
medication that the FDA approved as safe and effective over twenty
years ago.”327 Though this suggests the administration supports this
theory, it is not clear whether it will choose to participate in litigation
based on political or strategy considerations, including whether any

The FDA gained authority to regulate tobacco by statute decades later. See
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, H.R. 1256 (Pub. L. No.
111–31, June 22, 2009).
322 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 157-60.
323 Congress knows about the agency’s regulation of these drugs; individual
congresspeople frequently write to the agency when they disagree with its choices.
324 West Virginia v. EPA, at 5.
325 President Biden’s statement included this: “the President directed the Secretary
of Health and Human Services to identify all ways to ensure that mifepristone is as
widely accessible as possible.”
326 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-merrick-b-garland-statementsupreme-court-ruling-dobbs-v-jackson-women-s.
327 Fact Sheet, supra note 20.
321
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lawsuit might fare better without the government’s involvement. But
regardless, the issue will be litigated.
Indeed, when Mississippi banned abortion after Dobbs,
GenBioPro moved to amend the complaint in its pre-existing lawsuit
to challenge Mississippi’s general ban, arguing that it “operates as a de
facto ban on mifepristone and renders it essentially impossible for
GBP to operate in Mississippi,” citing the Zohydro litigation.328
GenBioPro does not need the FDA’s support to challenge to lodge a
preemption challenge based on its business interests.
2. HHS’s Role in Other Healthcare Matters
The preemption theory concerning medication abortion, if
accepted, would be transformative. But there are other federal statutes
that could also be used to preempt state abortion laws on a smaller—
and perhaps, less controversial—scale. We do not purport to offer an
exhaustive list of federal statutes that could be used to preempt state
abortion bans, 329 but we did want to highlight a few opportunities for
HHS to use its interpretive and enforcement authority to protect
abortion access.330
GenBioPro’s Memorandum in support of its motion to amend the complaint,
supra note X at 6.
329 Other preemption arguments rooted in existing federal statutes, though not
evaluated in any depth are: (1) whether the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, which governs employer sponsored insurance plans and preempts
state law, would provide protection for employers that cover abortion care or
abortion-related travel in states that ban it, see Brendan S. Maher, Pro-Choice Plans
(July 25, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=; (2) whether the
Medicare conditions of participation, which create rules for hospitals that accept
Medicare, could be used to require hospitals to offer abortion care. Before the
Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges, the federal government required
hospitals everywhere to allow same sex couples visitation rights, see See Medicare
and Medicaid Program; Revisions to Certain Patient's Rights Conditions of
Participation and Conditions for Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 73,873 (Dec. 12, 2014).;
(3) whether the Affordable Care Act’s prohibition of sex discrimination in
healthcare, known as Section 1557, might also be used to supplement these efforts.
HHS Secretary Becerra used Section 1557 to issue a guidance document to
pharmacies, explaining that withholding medications because they might cause
miscarriage or abortion violated federal law, see
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2022/07/13/hhs-issues-guidance-nationsretail-pharmacies-clarifying-their-obligations-ensure-access-comprehensivereproductive-health-care-services.html; and (4) whether the Hyde Amendment’s
exceptions for life, rape, and incest could be used to force states with abortion bans
that do not include these exceptions to allow Medicaid patients to obtain abortions
under these circumstances.
330 Notably, in a similar context, the Third Circuit—in an opinion joined by then
judge Samuel Alito—previously held that HHS’s interpretation of the Hyde
Amendment preempted state abortion laws to the contrary. Blackwell v. Knoll 61
F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 1995). There, HHS had interpreted Hyde’s rape and incest
exceptions to permit states to require that the person report the crime to law
328
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The first, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act
(EMTALA), is a federal statute that requires all hospitals participating
in Medicare and have an emergency room to screen patients for
medical emergencies and provide stabilizing treatment.331 This statute
can be used to preempt state abortion that do not have exceptions to
save the health of the pregnant person or the life of the pregnant
person; it could also preempt state abortion bans when their health-orlife exceptions are more narrow than the demands of EMTALA.332
Notably, as the antiabortion movement grows more extreme, its recent
abortion bans rarely contain health exceptions, and some states are
even considering bans without a life exception.333
Even when a state has exceptions for the life and health of the
pregnant person, they are notoriously vague or narrow, and, fearing
liability under the state law, doctors have delayed medically necessary
abortion care even though the patient’s life is on the line.334 Waiting
too long to treat a patient, for example, can cause the patient to
hemorrhage, lose their uterus and future fertility, or die.335 Since Dobbs,
throughout the country, there have been numerous media reports of
patients who have been forced to travel in the middle of a medical
emergency to access lifesaving abortion care because of physician delay
and uncertainty.336 In one study conducted in two Dallas hospitals after
SB8 made post-six-week abortions illegal found that that 57% of the
patients whose life-saving abortions were delayed to accommodate
abortion bans developed a serious morbidity, including the loss of a
enforcement, but only if there was an option for a physician to waive that
requirement. The Court found that a Pennsylvania law requiring a patient to report
their rape or incest to law enforcement to be eligible for Medicaid funding that
lacked a waiver was preempted.
331 42 U.S. Code § 1395dd.
332 See generally, Greer Donley & Kimberly Chernoby, How to Save Women’s Lives After
Roe, ATLANTIC (June 13, 2022),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/06/roe-v-wade-overturnmedically-necessary-abortion/661255/.
333 See e.g., https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/07/abortion-banlife-of-the-mother-exception/670582/.
334 Madeline Heim, If Roe is overturned, Wisconsin law would allow abortion only
'to save the life of the mother.' Doctors say it's not always so clear-cut, USA Today
(May 10, 2022), https://www.postcrescent.com/story/news/2022/05/10/doctorssay-wisconsin-abortion-laws-lifesaving-exception-vague-if-roe-v-wadeoverturned/7402200001/; Sneha Dey & Karen Brooks Harper, Abortion
restrictions threaten care for pregnant patients, providers say, Texas Tribune (May
24, 2022), https://www.texastribune.org/2022/05/24/texas-abortion-lawpregnancy-care/.
335 In Ireland, for instance, Savita Halappanavar died while waiting for life-saving
abortion care, spurring a massive backlash to the country’s abortion laws. Megan
Specia, How Savita Halappanavar’s Death Spurred Ireland’s Abortion Rights
Campaign, N.Y. Times (May 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/27/world/europe/savita-halappanavarireland-abortion.html
336 See e.g., https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2022/07/16/abortionmiscarriage-ectopic-pregnancy-care/.
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uterus, and none of their babies survived.337 Patients are suffering
because of medical inaction, and one day soon, one of them will die.338
Shortly after SB8 went into effect in Texas, in September 2021,
HHS Secretary Becerra sent a memorandum to hospitals entitled,
“Reinforcement of EMTALA Obligations specific to Patients who are
Pregnant or are Experiencing Pregnancy Loss.”339 This memo
reminded hospitals of their obligations under EMTALA, noting that
EMTALA duties “preempt[] any directly conflicting state law or
mandate that might otherwise prohibit or prevent such treatment” and
that “[a] hospital cannot cite State law or practice as the basis for
transfer” out of state.340 It specifically mentioned that ectopic
pregnancy and complications from pregnancy loss would qualify as
emergency medical conditions.341 Secretary Becerra announced this
position in a press release entitled, “HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra
Announces Actions to Protect Patients and Providers in Response to
Texas’ SB 8,” implying that the policy was a direct response to Texas’s
abortion ban.342
Contrary to the press release’s title, which did not go to
hospitals, the memorandum was ambiguous and tepid. The
memorandum did not use the word abortion once.343 Instead it focused
on people experiencing pregnancy loss. Many clinicians call abortions
in the context of inevitable or impending pregnancy loss by a different
name: miscarriage management—a term that more traditionally refers
to treatment for someone whose pregnancy has already ended. But the
euphemism “pregnancy loss” creates confusion. Hospitals may decide
that they are only obligated to provide treatment for “pregnancy loss”
after the fetus’s heart has stopped, thereby creating no conflict with
state law. Certainly, there is precedent for this interpretation. For
decades, religious hospitals have delayed medically necessary abortion
care until the fetus’s heart had stopped or the woman’s death was

https://www.ajog.org/action/showPdf?pii=S0002-9378%2822%2900536-1.
Jack Healy, With Roe Set to End, Many Women Worry About High-Risk Pregnancies,
N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/20/us/abortionhigh-risk-pregnancy.html; Carole Joffe and Jody Steinauer, Even Texas Allows
Abortions to Protect a Woman’s Life. Or Does It?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/12/opinion/abortion-texas-roe.html.
339 Reinforcement of EMTALA Obligations specific to Patients who are
Pregnant or are Experiencing Pregnancy Loss, CMS (Sept. 17, 2021),
https://www.cms.gov/files/document/qso-21-22-hospital.pdf. [hereinafter CMS
memo]
340 Id. at 1, 3.
341 Id. at 4.
342 HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra Announces Actions to Protect Patients and
Providers in Response to Texas’ SB 8, HHS (Sept. 17, 2021),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2021/09/17/hhs-secretary-xavier-becerraannounces-actions-protect-patients-and-providers-response-texas-sb.html
343 CMS Memo, supra note 312.
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imminent.344 By not saying the word abortion, HHS implicitly
supported the far-too-common approach of requiring a pregnancy loss
to be completed before offering care.
Providers needed clear, unequivocal guidance that, when an
emergency medical condition is present, EMTALA requires hospitals
and doctors to offer stabilizing abortion care without delay even when
the state bans it.345 Under the statute, a person is having a medical
emergency if they are in labor or suffering from a condition that,
without immediate attention, could be reasonably expected to place
their health in serious jeopardy, seriously impair their bodily function,
or cause serious dysfunction to an organ.346 This definition covers
many urgent pregnancy conditions, including preterm premature
rupture of membranes, ectopic pregnancy, and complications from
incomplete miscarriage or self-managed abortion, where offering
abortion is often the standard of care.347 Notably, because possible
damage to an organ qualifies, EMTALA would require abortion
treatment that, if delayed, could damage the uterus and fallopian tubes,
not just threaten a life.
Fortunately, the Biden Administration has taken further steps
in the months following Dobbs to clarify EMTALA’s relevance. The
new government website that was launched on the day Dobbs was
decided, reproductiverights.gov, states that under EMTALA, a
“hospital is required to provide you with the emergency care necessary
to save your life, including abortion care.” And President Biden’s
See e.g., Lori Freedman et al., When there's a heartbeat: miscarriage management in
Catholic-owned hospitals, 98 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1774 (2008); Lee Hasselbacher et
al., "My Hands Are Tied": Abortion Restrictions and Providers' Experiences in Religious and
Nonreligious Health Care Systems, 52 PERSPECTIVES SEXUAL REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
107 (2020). Though the ACLU attempted to sue a Catholic hospital system under
EMTALA in 2016, the lawsuit was dismissed for lack of standing. Am. Civil
Liberties Union v. Trinity Health Corp., 178 F. Supp. 3d 614, 621 (E.D. Mich.
2016). However, when an OBGYN was effectively fired for providing a medically
necessary abortion, he sued arguing that he was obligated to provide the abortion
to stabilize the patient under EMTALA. The Court refused to dismiss the lawsuit
and it settled before trial. Ritten v. Lapeer Reg’l Med. Ctr., 611 F. Supp. 2d 696, 704
(E.D. Mich. 2009).
345 Until recently, hospitals and hospital systems that were considering their
obligations after Dobbs were not taking EMTALA into account. See Lisa Harris,
Navigating Loss of Abortion Services—A Large Academic Medical Center
Prepares for the Overturn of Roe v. Wade, NEW ENGLAND J. MEDICINE (June 2,
2022), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2206246.
346 42 U.S. Code § 1395dd.
347 Donley & Chernoby, supra note 310. Indeed, the Office for Civil Rights within
HHS said as much in a guidance document released on the same day, but also not
sent to hospitals: “Lawful abortions under the Church Amendments also include
abortions performed in order to stabilize a patient when required under the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act.” Guidance on
Nondiscrimination Protections under the Church Amendments for Health Care
Personnel, HHS (Sept. 17, 2021), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/churchguidance.pdf.
344
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Executive Order mentioned above also directs HHS to “ensure that all
patients—including pregnant women and those experiencing
pregnancy loss, such as miscarriages and ectopic pregnancies—receive
the full protections for emergency medical care afforded under the
law.”348 Very soon after these actions were taken, Texas’s Attorney
General filed a lawsuit against HHS, arguing that its interpretation of
EMTALA “attempt[ed] to use federal law to transform every
emergency room in the country into a walk-in abortion clinic” and that
EMTALA cannot “compel healthcare providers to perform
abortions.”349 As of yet there has been no ruling in this case.
But HHS was not deterred; instead, it worked with the DOJ to
file its own lawsuit that facially challenges Idaho’s abortion ban as
violating EMTALA for lacking a health exception (only containing a
narrow life exception).350 This development is very important—
guidance documents mean nothing without corresponding action.
HHS should also enforce the statute against specific hospitals that are
accused of delaying care, but those enforcement actions require
patients to file complaints with the agency. HHS should continue to
spread awareness about the law and makes the complaint filing system
more user friendly so that more patients complain, and the agency can
enforce the statute.351
A second federal law, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), preempts policies or actions that
compromise the privacy of abortion seekers.352 This law generally
prohibits healthcare providers from disclosing peoples’ private health
information, and it can be enforced against providers who report
patients to law enforcement for suspected abortion unless one of the
law enforcement exceptions are met. A hard-to-determine number of
people who use medication abortion without legal permission will seek
medical care at a hospital. We know from past cases, that some hospital
staff will report those they suspect of self-managed abortion.353 These
people are violating HIPAA if they are not acting pursuant to a legal
exception.
The relevant exceptions are all created by regulations: (1) if a
state law mandates disclosure, (2) if the provider is complying with a
Fact Sheet, supra note 20. The state of Texas has sued the Biden Administration,
arguing that HHS has misinterpreted the requirements of EMTALA, overstepped
its authority, and acted arbitrarily. Texas v. Becerra, Civil Action 5:22-cv-00185-H
(N.D. Tex. July 14, 2022).
349 https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/images/executivemanagement/20220714_1-0_Original%20Complaint%20Biden%20Admin.pdf.
350 https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1523481/download.
351 Donley & Chernoby, supra note 310.
352 42 U.S. Code § 1320d–6
353 Carrie N. Baker, Texas Woman Lizelle Herrera’s Arrest Foreshadows Post-Roe Future,
MS. MAGAZINE (April 16, 2022), https://msmagazine.com/2022/04/16/texaswoman-lizelle-herrera-arrest-murder-roe-v-wade-abortion/.
348
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lawfully executed subpoena, (3) if the person suspects a crime occurred
involving the death of a person, (4) if the person suspects child abuse,
(5) to avert a serious threat to health or safety, or (6) if the person
suspects a crime occurred on hospital property. 354 These exceptions
create many problems. First, states can get around HIPAA if they pass
a law requiring healthcare providers to report suspected abortion,
similar to how many states require providers to report child abuse to
law enforcement. As of right now, we are not aware of any state that
has such a law, but mandated disclosure could eventually come into
play. Second, providers cannot use HIPAA as a shield if served with a
summons, warrant, subpoena, or administrative request. Note, though,
that for this exception to apply, the provider would be responding to,
not initiating contact with law enforcement.
Third, if a state passes a law endowing fetuses with personhood
status, like in Georgia, then a provider might be able to evade HIPAA
and affirmatively report a patient to law enforcement on the premise
that they suspect that a crime occurred involving the death of a person
(the fetus). The child abuse exception is similar—some states interpret
a fetus to be a child under child abuse laws.355 To address this issue,
the federal government can issue guidance that, under federal law, a
fetus is not a person or a child, preempting state interpretations to the
contrary under HIPAA.
Finally, a provider could argue that HIPAA does not apply in
the context of self-managed abortion because a crime is occurring on
their property. This is the most attenuated argument, suggesting that
an abortion crime continues past the act of taking the medication and
into the process of expelling pregnancy tissue over the course of days
or weeks. Again, the federal government could clarify that this
exception is met only if a patient takes abortion-inducing drugs on
hospital property. Like the EMTALA discussion above, HHS would
not only need to issue guidance, but also enforce the statute if it wants
to pressure covered entities in a way that mitigates the risk on the other
side.
In June 2022, the Biden Administration issued guidance
seeking to clarify how HIPAA relates to abortion-related crimes.
Though there is more that can be said, as noted above, and more that
can be done, this was an important step. The guidance discussed the
mandated disclosure exception, stating that “[w]here state law does not
expressly require [the reporting of abortion crimes], the Privacy Rule
would not permit a disclosure to law enforcement under the ‘required

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule: A
Guide for Law Enforcement, HHS,
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/specia
l/emergency/final_hipaa_guide_law_enforcement.pdf.
355 See e.g., Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
354
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by law’ permission.”356 For the court order exception, the guidance
stated: “[i]f the request is not accompanied by a court order or other
mandate enforceable in a court of law, the Privacy Rule would not
permit the clinic to disclose PHI in response to the request.”357 It also
addressed the exception allowing disclosures to “avert a serious threat
to health or safety,” noting that healthcare workers cannot disclose
protected health information just because they believe such a
disclosure would prevent harm to a fetus.358 Specifically, the agency
addressed the example where a patient tells a healthcare worker that
they plan to obtain an abortion out of state. The healthcare workers
may not share that with law enforcement absent a court-order
document.359
Outside of issuing guidance, the Biden Administration could
go further. All of the law enforcement exceptions are created by
regulation, meaning that HHS could initiate rulemaking to modify the
regulations to specifically exempt abortion-related crimes from each
exception, even when the state mandates disclosure or issues a
subpoena. If that were to happen, federal law theoretically would
preempt the state law, subject to some of the counterarguments raised
in the section above.
As the arguments for and against preemption make clear, the
stakes are high for federal agencies and for states deploying what they
consider to be their police powers to ban abortion. The uncertainty of
the result is perhaps why preemption has not been litigated by abortion
supporters until now. But as the abortion crisis intensifies, the stakes
have changed. This effort, along with more like it in the future, will
spark new debates about the balance of state–federal power in abortion
law.
B.

Federal Land

Another opportunity the federal government has to promote
abortion access is to use federal land. There is neither a general federal
prohibition on abortion, nor, for purposes of this section, a prohibition
on abortions being performed on federal land. There is, under the
Hyde Amendment, a prohibition on federal dollars being used to
perform abortions that do not fall within the provision’s exceptions
for life, incest, or rape.360 However, that leaves space for the federal
government to lease space on federal land to some private entity to
HIPAA Privacy Rule and Disclosures of Information Relating to Reproductive
Health Care, DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/privacy/guidance/phi-reproductive-health/index.html.
357 Id.
358 Id.
359 Id.
360 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 134 Stat. 1182, div. H, §§ 506–07 (Pub. L.
No. 116260, Dec. 27, 2020).
356
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perform abortions there.361 Those providers would have a
reasonable—though certainly controversial—argument that state
criminal and civil abortion bans do not apply on federal land, and they
are therefore free to lawfully provide abortions there, even if the state
within which the federal land is situated has otherwise banned
abortion.
The key to this legal analysis is the Assimilative Crimes Act
(ACA).362 This relatively little-known federal law is the mechanism by
which the federal government bans criminal activity on federal land 363
without passing specific laws to do so. When someone engages in
behavior on federal land for which there is no crime “punishable by
any enactment of Congress,” this Act makes it a federal crime if that
behavior “would be punishable if committed or omitted within the
jurisdiction of the State, Territory, Possession, or District in which [the
federal land] is situated.”364 Someone falling under this provision is
“guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment.”365
The ACA in this regard applies only on particular federal land.
The statute differentiates between federal land that is considered an
exclusive enclave, which would mean it is covered by the ACA, and
federal land over which the state reserved jurisdiction when it
transferred the land to the federal government, which would put it

Under a lease between the federal government and an abortion provider, the
money would flow from abortion providers to the federal government rather than
the other way around; thus, the Hyde Amendment would not be implicated.
Further, leasing property to an abortion provider would be no different than
leasing property to any other business on federal land, such as, in Peoples v. Puget
Sound’s Best Chicken!, Inc., 345 P.3d 811 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015), a Popeye’s
chicken restaurant. The President would not need to be involved through any
executive order or any new agency regulation (just as neither was needed, for
instance, to lease property to Popeye’s). However, knowing that the current
administration supports this option would be almost a necessary prerequisite to a
provider considering exploring this possibility because of the role the Department
of Justice has in directing enforcement of federal law and the President has in
issuing pardons. See discussion infra notes 375-77 and accompanying text. So far,
the Biden administration has shown little interest in this option despite other
Democrats urging the President to try. Emma Platoff, Senator Elizabeth Warren Calls
on Biden to Use Federal Lands to Protect Abortion Access, BOSTON GLOBE, June 24,
2022, https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/06/24/metro/senator-elizabethwarren-calls-biden-use-federal-lands-protect-abortion-access/.
362 18 U.S.C.A. § 13.
363 18 U.S.C.A. § 7(3) defines federal land as “Any lands reserved or acquired for
the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction
thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by
consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of
a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building.”
364 18 U.S.C.A. § 13(a).
365 Id.
361
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outside the coverage of the ACA.366 Unfortunately, there is no easilyand publicly-accessible way to tell the difference for any particular part
of federal land as this determination involves intense factual analysis
relying on dated documents and often contested history.367 Thus, as a
preliminary matter, discerning exactly where the ACA applies and
where it does not is a difficult hurdle.368
At first blush, it may seem that state laws criminalizing abortion
would be actionable under the ACA. But there are a few pieces of the
ACA that are important to understand for our argument. First,
someone who engages in behavior on federal land that is punishable
as a crime under state law is not prosecuted by the state. Rather, the
ACA incorporates the state crime into federal law so that technically,
the person has violated the federal ACA, not the state law.369 That
means that federal prosecutors prosecute these crimes in federal court,
not state prosecutors in state court.370 Federal prosecutors in an
administration that supports abortion rights could exercise
enforcement discretion on federal land, and state prosecutors who
disagree would have no ability to prosecute on their own. Further, a
President who supports abortion rights but is fearful that a successor
who feels otherwise might later prosecute within the statute of
limitations could pardon the providers on federal land for all potential
abortion-related crimes under the ACA.371 If that were to happen,
those providers would be immune from prosecution for past abortions
even if the White House’s position on abortion changes. Abortion
provision in the future, however, would be vulnerable.
It is estimated that just 6% of federal land is considered a federal enclave. JOHN
D. LESHY, ROBERT L. FISCHMAN, & SARAH A. KRAKOFF, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND
AND RESOURCES LAW 142 (8th ed. 2022).
367 Paul, 371 U.S. 245.
368 National parks are federal enclaves, see United States v. Harris, 10 F.4th 1005,
1008 (10th Cir. 2021), as are many military bases and related locations, see, e.g.,
Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (S.D. Cal. 2007). However, federal
properties located on state land, such as post office buildings, courthouses, office
buildings, and prisons are not enclaves unless they are located on federal land that
qualifies. See West River Elec. Ass’n, Inc. v. Black Hills Power & Light Co., 719 F.
Supp. 1489, 1499 (D.S.D. 1989).
369 “Prosecution under the ACA is not for enforcement of state law but for
enforcement of federal law assimilating a state statute.” United States v. Brown,
608 F.2d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1979).
370 United States v. Ware, 190 F. Supp. 645, 659 (N.D. Cal. 1960), affirmed in part,
vacated in part, Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963). Paul reaffirmed the
principle that Congressional regulation of federal land “bars state regulation
without specific congressional action.” Id. at 263.
371 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 351 (1866) (“The Constitution gives him
unlimited power in respect to pardon, save only in cases of impeachment. . . . It is,
therefore, within the power of the President to limit his pardon, as in those cases in
which it is individual and after conviction, to the mere release of the penalty—it is
equally within his prerogative to extend it so as to include a whole class of
offenders—to interpose this act of clemency before trial or conviction; and not
merely to take away the penalty, but to forgive and obliterate the offence.”).
366
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Second, the ACA does not incorporate all state criminal law.
In Lewis v. U.S., the Court laid out a two-step test for determining if
the ACA assimilates state criminal law. First, if the defendant’s act or
omission is not made punishable by a federal law, “that will normally
end the matter” because without federal law criminalizing the conduct,
“the ACA presumably would assimilate the [state] statute.”372 Lower
courts have made clear that this inquiry includes exploring whether
federal regulations cover the conduct.373 If federal law does make the
act punishable, courts must ask the second question of whether
application of state law would interfere with federal policy, rewrite an
offense Congress carefully considered, or federal law occupies the
field.374 This two-step analysis poses a challenge because the answer to
the first question with respect to almost all state abortion law is that
Congress has not made abortion punishable by federal law.375
However, the Court in Lewis indicated that incorporating state
law if there is no federal law criminalizing the conduct is only the
“normal” and “presumptive” conclusion; it did not foreclose a
different conclusion in all situations. In the context of state abortion
law, there is a strong argument—though untested post-Lewis—that
this reaching the conclusion that state abortion law applies because
there is no federal law prohibiting abortion is not the right answer. The
Lewis inquiry was developed in the context of criminal activity that is
universally prohibited, such as the homicide at issue in that case,
because the inquiry answers which sovereign’s law should apply. Lewis
makes less sense for actions that are not inherently criminal. In fact, it
is hard to argue that Lewis has any application when the current federal
government has a policy of protecting the behavior the state government
makes criminal, something that is certainly not the case for homicide
but is the case for abortion.376 There is precedent for this line of
argument under the ACA from multiple lower courts that refused to
apply state bans on union shop agreements on federal land because
federal law “expressly permits union shop agreements.”377 Although
these lower court cases about federal law permitting behavior predate
Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 164 (1998).
See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 979 F.2d 320, 322 (3d Cir. 1992) (“We agree with
those courts that have concluded that a federal regulation does qualify as ‘an
enactment of Congress.’”); United States v. Palmer, 956 F.2d 189, 191 (9th Cir.
1992).
374 Id.
375 With the exception of 18 U. S. C. §1531 (2000 ed., Supp. IV), which prohibits a
particular form of later abortion Congress dubbed “partial-birth abortion.”
376 The White House, Remarks by President Biden on Protecting Access to
Reproductive Health Care Services, July 8, 2022,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speechesremarks/2022/07/08/remarks-by-president-biden-on-protecting-access-toreproductive-health-care-services/.
377 King v. Gemini Food Serv., Inc., 438 F. Supp. 964, 966 (E.D. Va. 1976); Lord v.
Local Union No. 2088, 646 F.2d 1057, 1061-62 (5th Cir. 1981); Vincent v. Gen.
Dynamics Corp., 427 F. Supp. 786, 800 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
372
373
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Lewis and its focus on federal laws that criminalize behavior, they are
consistent with the Supreme Court’s statements about the ACA’s
goals.378
Providers who want to avoid state abortion bans post-Roe by
leasing space from federal agencies or programs, would have several
similar arguments at their disposal, many of which dovetail with the
preemption arguments described above.379 Because federal regulations
can be the source of federal law under the ACA, the FDA or its parent,
HHS, could assist this effort by issuing a regulation about its authority
over medication abortion, particularly on federal land. As described
earlier, the FDA closely regulates this medication and has approved it
because it is safe and effective.380 An FDA or HHS statement to this
effect mentioning federal land in particular would give providers a
strong argument that they could prescribe and distribute abortion
medication without fear of legal punishment while on federal land.
This would not mean that people on federal land would have access to
abortion in the same manner as before Roe was overturned because
abortion medication is, at this time, only FDA-approved for
terminating pregnancies up through ten weeks of gestation.381
However, early abortion access would remain in a post-Roe world—
even within states where abortion is illegal—as long as the medication
was distributed (and perhaps, taken) on federal land.382
There is also an argument that federal law, as it currently exists,
already precludes the application of state law regarding abortion on
federal land. This argument could take several different forms. For
instance, providers could argue that even in the absence of an agency
statement, the FDA’s approval of the medication abortion regimen
along with its strong statements about the safety of the drug protocol 383
are not merely permission from the federal government for providers
Sadrakula, 309 U.S. at 103-04 (“But the authority of state laws or their
administration may not interfere with the carrying out of a national purpose. Where
enforcement of the state law would handicap efforts to carry out the plans of the
United States, the state enactment must, of course, give way.”).
379 As discussed in this paragraph and the two that follow, the issue is whether the
federal government has a policy, either through FDA regulation of mifepristone or
through federal abortion law more generally, that precludes application of state law
on federal land because of a conflict between the two under the terms of the ACA.
The preemption argument in Part III.A. of this Article is similar in that it looks to
conflict between state and federal law, but it is independent of the ACA and its
unique case law. Moreover, the general preemption argument would apply beyond
federal land and in all parts of a state.
380 See supra Part I.B.
381 Id.
382 The background rule for dispensation of drugs is that the care is provided where
it is dispensed, not consumed, but one could imagine an antiabortion state taking
the position that the abortion occurs on their land when the pills are consumed
there. For this reason, it might be safer to require the patient to consume the drugs
on federal land as well.
383 See supra Part III.A.
378
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to perform abortions in this manner, but constitute the policy of the
federal government, something that was certainly absent in Lewis for
homicide and is more akin to the lower court union shop cases
mentioned above. That the FDA has expressly permitted the use of
medication abortion could mean that state bans on the use of this
protocol—whether through specific bans on medication abortion or
general bans on abortion—should not be applicable on federal lands
under the ACA.
Taking this argument further, providers could argue that the
federal government’s regulation of abortion occupies the field with
respect to the matter. In addition to FDA regulation, Congress has
prohibited so-called “partial-birth abortion”384 and outlawed acts that
cause the death of an “unborn child.”385 Every year, Congress renews
the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits federal dollars from being
spent on abortion.386 Under the Affordable Care Act, Congress bans
abortion from being part of the insurance options offered on
Obamacare exchanges,387 and there are many different provisions
protecting freedom of conscience with respect to abortion provision
and refusal.388 These different laws, taken together, could be seen as
the complete set of laws that Congress has chosen to adopt for
purposes of federal abortion law, making anything that is not explicitly
illegal, legal on federal lands. This interpretation would permit
abortions on federal land at any point in pregnancy, so long as it
complies with federal abortion laws. The Supreme Court has made
clear that “through the comprehensiveness of its regulation,” Congress
can occupy the field and thus preclude the application of state law
through the ACA.389 This argument would posit that these federal
abortion laws and regulations do just that with respect to how the
federal government wants to treat abortion within its own laws,
meaning on federal lands.390

18 U.S.C. § 1531.
1 U.S.C. § 8.
386 Consolidated Appropriations Act (2021), supra note 329.
387 42 U.S.C. §18023
388 For a thorough list of federal laws relating to abortion refusal, see SECRETARIAT
OF PRO-LIFE ACTIVITIES, CURRENT FEDERAL LAWS PROTECTING CONSCIENCE
RIGHTS (May 2019), https://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religiousliberty/conscience-protection/upload/Federal-Conscience-Laws-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
389 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 165 (citing Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 60405 (1991)).
390 Providers might even claim that because the United States already prohibits one
form of abortion, so-called “partial-birth abortion,” other forms of abortion are
presumed to be lawful under federal law and that this presumption should preclude
the application of state law to the contrary. United States v. Butler, 541 F.2d 730,
737 (8th Cir. 1976) (“[T]he fact that the federal statutes are narrower in scope does
not allow the federal government to use state law to broaden the definition of a
federal crime.”).
384
385
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Although the ACA concerns whether criminal abortion law
applies on federal land, states have also passed abortion laws that are
civil in nature—infamously, Texas’s SB8. For civil law on federal land,
there is no law comparable to the ACA that wholesale incorporates
non-conflicting state civil law. Rather, there are individual statutes that
incorporate some specific state civil laws, such as wrongful death or
personal injury.391 For other civil actions, “[w]hen federal law neither
addresses the civil law question nor assimilates pertinent state law, the
applicable law is the state law that was in effect at the time that the
state ceded jurisdiction to the United States.”392 Because Texas’s SB8
and any copycat laws from other states are of such recent vintage, they
would be precluded from being incorporated on federal land.393
Abortion providers would have to deal with the possibility of a wrongful
death lawsuit if allowed under state law in a post-Roe world. The risk
of such a lawsuit, particularly from patient relatives who might disagree
with the patient’s decision, might be an insurmountable barrier for
some providers. Abortion providers concerned about this liability,
however, could require patients—and possibly others related to the
patient—to sign waivers from suing under state wrongful death
provisions.
We also want to be careful to highlight that our ACA analysis
is limited to the legal risk people will face while on federal land. Once
those people—whether provider, patient, or helper—are back on state
land, the state’s abortion laws would apply. This could subject
providers, patients, and helpers to state abortion criminal or civil law
when they travel to or from federal land,394 even if the ACA protects
providers, patients, and helpers while on that federal land. Moreover,
the location of the clinic within an antiabortion state’s borders, albeit
on federal land, would make it easy to surveille for the purpose of
identifying the people visiting it. While this risk would be real, for over
150 years the Supreme Court has recognized, under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause, that every American
has the right to travel to and from federal lands to conduct business
there.395 While these precedents specifically refer to conducting
business with the federal government, the same rationale of
prohibiting states from interfering with people traveling to enjoy the

28 U.S.C.A. § 5001.
JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN, & MARK SQUILLACE, PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW § 3:8 (2d ed. 2009) (using Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439
(1929) as an illustrative example of this point).
393 See, e.g., Balderrama v. Pride Indus., Inc., 963 F. Supp. 2d 646, 656 (W.D. Tex.
2013).
394 With all of the complications discussed above in Section II regarding states
punishing abortion travel or extraterritorial abortion.
395 Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79-80 (1872); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35,
43-44 (1867).
391
392
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privileges and immunities of their federal government should apply to
conducting any federally approved business on federal land.
We recognize that the arguments put forth here are based on
untested interpretations of federal law that raise thorny questions
about the relationship between the federal government and the states.
These questions as they apply to federal lands are not well developed
in scholarship or federal court decisions, as “relatively few published
decisions have engaged the ACA, and even fewer scholars have done
so. As a result, the ACA has received little analytical treatment.”396 But
the point here is the same as with the other issues covered in this
Article: reliance on the ACA to shield abortion provision on federal
land from the application of state criminal abortion bans would raise
unexplored interjurisdictional legal issues that have previously been
unaddressed in the long history of abortion conflict.397

C. Expanding Access to Medication Abortion
The federal government, sometimes along with abortionsupportive states, can apply various policies to remove obstacles to
medication abortion. If they attempt to do so, medication abortion will
become more accessible everywhere, including in states that ban
abortion. Antiabortion states will try to resist this new abortion frontier
but might see their efforts thwarted by federal policies and a lack of
cooperation from other states. This section explores some of these
possibilities and notes the areas in which federal intervention could
make a significant difference, namely, in FDA regulation, telehealth
infrastructure, medical licensure, and the standard of care for
medication abortion.
First, the FDA could lift the remaining restrictions on the
dispensation of mifepristone that make the drug harder to access
across the country.398 The first two REMS requirements—that
Nihkil Bhagat, Filling the Gap? Non-Abrogation Provisions and the Assimilative Crimes
Act, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 77, 80 (2011).
397 Interjurisdictional issues would also arise with abortion provision on Native
land, though we do not cover this thicket of a topic here as it involves different
issues of national and tribal sovereignty that are beyond the scope of this Article’s
focus on states battling each other and the federal government. See Heidi L.
Guzmán, Roe on the Rez: The Case for Expanding Abortion Access on Tribal Land, 9
Colum. J. Race & L. 95 (2018); Lauren van Schilfgaarde et al., The Indian Country
Abortion Safe Harbor Fallacy, Law & Political Economy Blog, June 6, 2022,
https://lpeproject.org/blog/the-indian-country-abortion-safe-harbor-fallacy/.
Importantly, we agree with the concern that it is racially insensitive and wrong to
suggest that indigenous peoples, who struggle to access equitable healthcare, have
any obligation to use their land for this purpose. Moreover, a week after Dobbs, the
Supreme Court drastically cut back on tribal sovereignty over their own land. See
Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, No. 21-429 (June 29, 2022).
398 The FDA could also permit medication abortion through 12 weeks of
pregnancy, which is supported by evidence of the drug’s effectiveness through that
396
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providers become “certified” to prescribe the drug with the
manufacturer and that patients sign an extra informed consent form—
have existed since the FDA first approved mifepristone.399 The
certification process requires providers to register with the drug
manufacturer, affirming that they can identify and treat mifepristone’s
rare adverse effects.400 Doing so is an extra administrative burden that
discourages providers from prescribing mifepristone given that it
might expose them to boycotts, protests, and violence if their status as
an abortion provider becomes known to the public.401 This process
also disincentivizes general obstetricians and primary care providers
from offering medication abortion as part of their practices.402 In the
same vein, the FDA’s additional informed consent requirement—the
Patient Agreement Form, which patients sign before beginning a
medication abortion—remains in place despite duplicating what
providers already communicate to patients.403
The FDA re-evaluated the mifepristone REMS in December
2021, removing the requirement that patients pick up the drug in
person and creating two additional ways that patients can receive
mifepristone.404 The first is through the mail, supervised by a certified
provider, which was a practice the FDA allowed over the course of the
pandemic. The second is new: dispensation by a pharmacy. However,
the FDA added a new REMS element that pharmacies also must seek
certification to dispense mifepristone. As of today, the path ahead for
pharmacies is not clear as the FDA has not yet defined the process of
pharmacy certification.
Based on the pharmacy certification requirements for other
drugs, a range of requirements could be enacted.405 For example, the

time. The FDA has done this previously, in 2016, when it approved mifepristone
use through 10, rather than 7, weeks. Donley, supra note 54, at 14.
399 Id.
400 Donley, supra note 54, at 11.
401 See generally DAVID S. COHEN & KRYSTEN CONNON, LIVING IN THE
CROSSHAIRS: THE UNTOLD STORIES OF ANTI-ABORTION TERRORISM (2015).
402 Carrie N. Baker, Online Abortion Provider and “Activist Physician” Michele Gomez Is
Expanding Early Abortion Options Into Primary Care, MS. MAG. (Jan. 19, 2022),
https://msmagazine.com/2022/01/19/online-abortion-primary-care-doctormichele-gomez-mya-network/.
403 Rachel Rebouché, Greer Donley, David S. Cohen, Progress In The Bid To Make
Abortion Pills More Widely Available, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 22, 2021),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/12/22/opinion/progress-bid-makeabortion-pills-more-widely-available/.
404 Questions and Answers on Mifeprex, U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Dec.
16, 2021, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/postmarket-drug-safety-informationpatients-and-providers/questions-and-answers-mifeprex.
405 Other drugs are subject to pharmacy certification under a REMS, and those
requirements vary in what additional dispensation and administrative restrictions
they impose. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REMS DISPENSER CERTIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS (June 1, 2013),
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FDA could require pharmacies to apply for an authorization number
that marks the prescription as valid for a certain period of time or limit
the number of times that a drug is dispensed to an individual. 406 Other
requirements might be imposed as well, such as a system that
documents compliance with the REMS, ongoing education and
training for pharmacists, and counseling for patients.
The FDA can ensure that the yet-to-be-determined pharmacy
certification process is reflective of mifepristone’s safety and imposes
minimal requirements. A simple way to implement certification is to
have a pharmacy representative attest, when ordering mifepristone
from the distributor, that there are licensed pharmacists at the
pharmacy or within the pharmacy chain willing to dispense it. As is
true for provider certification, overly burdensome obligations on
pharmacies will discourage them from carrying mifepristone.407
At present, only two mail-order pharmacies dispense
mifepristone. The leading entity is Honeybee Health, which started in
2018 and began dispensing medication abortion when the in-person
requirement was suspended during the pandemic.408 Operating in a
space of regulatory transition while the FDA defines pharmacy
certification, Honeybee Health has seen an “80% increase in demand
for abortion pills, which now make up roughly 30% of the company’s
orders.”409 Restrictions that make pharmacy certification easier could
entice some pharmacies to carry medication abortion, but, of course,
the nature of the certification process is only one factor: pharmacies
may not be willing to risk the costs of stigma and harassment unless
those costs decrease and the benefits—symbolic, political or financial
—increase.410 At the moment, there are few signs that retail pharmacies

https://www.fda.gov/files/about%20fda/published/REMS-DispenserCertification-Requirements.pdf.
406 This rule might attempt to stop a pregnant abortion rights supporter from
obtaining multiple prescriptions with the purpose of sending the drugs to people in
other states. It could also impede advance provision of medication pills, the
availability of which could vary by state law. Carrie N. Baker, Online Abortion Provider
Robin Tucker: “I’m Trying to Remove Barriers. … It Feels Great To Be Able To Help People
This Way”, MS. MAG. (Jan. 1, 2022), https://msmagazine.com/2022/01/04/onlineabortion-pills-provider-robin-tucker-virginia-maryland-maine/.
407 Rachel Rebouché, Remote Reproductive Rights, 100 AM. J. L. MED. __ (forthcoming
2022); Donley, supra note X, at 646-47.
408 Abagail Abrams, Meet the Pharmacist Expanding Access to Abortion Pills
Across the U.S., TIME (June 13, 2022), https://time.com/6183395/abortion-pillshoneybee-health-online-pharmacy/.
409 Id.
410 When the draft Dobbs opinion leaked in May 2022, many companies made it
publicly known they would cover travel expenses for employees required to travel
out of state for abortion care. That number has only increased since the final
opinion was issues on June 24, 2022. In its statement, for example, Levi Strauss
sought to rally private industry support: “[g]iven what is at stake, business leaders
need to make their voices heard.” Emma Goldberg, These Companies Will Cover
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are eager to dispense mifepristone.411 In June 2022, the five largest
pharmacy companies declined to comment on whether they would
seek certification: CVS indicated it would assess future facts once
permitted to dispense mifepristone, and Walgreens implied that it will
not seek pharmacy certification.412 And no pharmacy is willing to
knowingly dispense medication abortion in states that ban it.
In sum, easing or eliminating FDA restrictions on medication
abortion would make it easier for new providers to practice in abortion
supportive states, and pharmacies to dispense it, helping them scale up
to meet the demand of out-of-state patients traveling there. Because
this decision is supported by medical experts and is part of the FDA’s
ordinary functions, the agency would not need to rely on any novel
legal theories to act.413 In fact, any challenge to the agency’s action here,
which would inevitably come, would be unlikely to succeed.414
Second, general barriers to telehealth impede access to remote
medication abortion care, which the federal government, along with
states, can work to improve. Specifically, the Biden Administration
could deploy its power to declare a public health emergency or
engender action through a series of executive orders.415 The executive
branch used both types of measures in recent years as responses to the
COVID-19 pandemic.
During the pandemic, telehealth exploded across many
healthcare sectors and nationally, in part because of the support of
federal orders.416 Despite this growth, there remains unequal access to
telehealth, mirroring broader disparities in the distribution of health
resources.417 Most abortion patients live below the federal poverty line
and indicate that their chief reason for terminating a pregnancy is the
inability to afford the costs of raising a child.418 Those same patients
need access to a telehealth-capable device, high-speed data
transmission, and digital literacy. Take for instance unequal access to

Travel Expenses for Employee Abortions, N.Y. Times (June 30, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/abortion-companies-travel-expenses.html.
411 Donley, supra note 54.
412 Id.
413 Ironically, if the FDA removed the entire REMS, this might harm the
preemption argument made in this Part’s first section, but it would nevertheless
provide broader access to everyone.
414 Donley, supra note X, at 686-89.
415 Fact Sheet, supra note 20.
416 David Hoffman, Increasing Access to Care: Telehealth During COVID-19, 7 J. L. &
BIOSCIENCES 1, 2 (2020).
417 Cason Schmit et al., Telehealth in the COVID-19 Pandemic, in ASSESSING LEGAL
RESPONSES TO COVID-19, at 102 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 2020).
418 See DIANA GREENE FOSTER, THE TURNAWAY STUDY: TEN YEARS, A
THOUSAND WOMEN, AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF HAVING – OR BEING DENIED
– AN ABORTION (2020).
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broadband internet service.419 The “digital divide” disproportionately
affects communities of color and low-income individuals as well as
rural populations that lack the infrastructure that can make telehealth
methods broadly available.420 Non-English speakers have additional
barriers for navigating telehealth, and people with cognitive difficulties
or other disabilities may have trouble interacting via video.421 The
federal government could use its spending power, as it did over the
course of the pandemic, to invest in the infrastructure that makes
telemedicine work. The ripple effects of doing so would benefit those
seeking abortion via telehealth.
These efforts, however, depend on state cooperation, and,
here, the federal government would have to play an advocacy role in
promoting permissive state telehealth policies.422 During the pandemic,
with the assistance of federal agencies like HHS, DOJ, and CDC,
states began to recognize various modes of telehealth delivery, such as
over the telephone for some services, thereby removing the
requirement of a video link.423 Also with federal guidance and federal
protection from liability, many states waived and some states repealed
rules limiting the reach of telehealth, such as how a patient-provider
relationship is established or permitting out-of-state providers to
practice in state.424 Many of these interventions stemmed from powers
accorded to the Administration to declare a public health emergency.
Although some have called for President Biden to declare a public
health emergency in response to Dobbs, the Administration is still
considering the option and weighing the language of relevant statutes
that grant the President such power, including the challenges that any
declaration would certainly face in courts.425
See Betsy Lawton, COVID-19 Illustrates Need to Close the Digital Divide, in
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 379, at 191.
420 Alexandra Thompson et al., The Disproportionate Burdens of the Mifepristone REMS,
20 CONTRACEPTION 1, 3 (2021).
421 Jorge A. Rodriguez et al., Disparities in Telehealth Use among California Patients with
Limited English Proficiency, 40 HEALTH AFF. 487 (Mar. 2021),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2020.00823.
422 Hudson Worthy, The New Norm in Healthcare: Telehealth, 15 CHARLESTON L. REV.
549, 550 (2020).
423 See Schmit et al., supra note 379.
424 See Kyle Faget, Telehealth in the Wake of COVID-19, 22 J. HEALTH CARE
COMPLIANCE 5, 6 (2020).
425 Associated Press, Biden Says He’s Mulling Health Emergency for Abortion Access,
POLITICO, July 10, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/10/bidenhealth-emergency-abortion-access-00044936. Under this approach, the Biden
Administration could declare a public health emergency under a statute like the
Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (Prep) Act. Under the Prep Act, the
Secretary of HHS can issue a declaration that offers immunity from liability, except
for willful misconduct, for “entities and individuals involved in the development,
manufacture, testing, distribution, administration, and use of [ ] countermeasures”
to fight an epidemic or pandemic. 45 U.S.C.S. § 247d-6d. Countermeasures are
approved products that assist in fighting an epidemic or pandemic, which can
419
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Third, the federal government, along with supportive states,
can work to improve the national distribution of abortion providers by
making it easier to practice medicine across states. Over the past few
years, an increasing number of states permitted physicians to treat outof-state patients, using telemedicine, if providers were in good standing
in their home jurisdiction and registered with state boards.426 Although
most pandemic-related waivers of state telehealth restrictions have
expired,427 the growing acceptance of telehealth across state lines has
prompted calls for uniform policy, particularly as related to physician
licensure.428 Thirty states are currently members of the Interstate
Medical Licensure Compact (IMLC), which “offers a voluntary,
expedited pathway to licensure for physicians who qualify.”429 Three
additional states have legislation pending.430 The IMLC utilizes a
“mutual recognition” model that aims to increase access to health care
for patients in rural and underserved areas. The IMLC does not grant
automatic cross-border licensure but makes the process of obtaining
practice permission in another state easier. Professionals obtaining
licensure through the IMLC “still face in-state barriers because
approval ultimately remains within the individual state medical board’s
discretion and physicians still need to retain a license in every state they
practice in.”431 Reiterating a theme of this Article, polarized approaches
to abortion regulation could undermine the emerging consensus
include material assistance and drugs. So a declaration under the Act could “enable
out-of-state prescribing and dispensing of medications for abortion for those in
states with abortion bans.” Nancy Northup, Biden Must Declare a Public Health
Emergency for Abortion, WASH. POST, June 30, 2022,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/06/30/declare-abortionpublic-health-emergency. The Act does not define epidemic or pandemic, so
application of the law would turn on making the case for why abortion bans and
the abortion care shortage result in widespread and dire health consequences for
millions of people. Jennifer L. Piatt, Summer Ghaith, & Madisyn Puchebner, The
Network for Public Health Law, Abortion Access: A Post-Roe Public Health
Emergency, June 21, 2022, https://www.networkforphl.org/
426 Kate Nelson, “To Infinity and Beyond”: A Limitless Approach to Telemedicine Beyond
State Borders, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 1017 (2020).
427 See also Kerri Pinchuk, California Policy Recommendations for Realizing the Promise of
Medication Abortion: How the Covid-19 Public Health Emergency Offers a Unique Lens for
Catalyzing Change, 18 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 265 (2021); Katherine Fang
& Rachel Perler, Abortion in the Time of COVID-19: Telemedicine Restrictions and the
Undue Burden Test, 32 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 134, 135 (2021).
428 Nathaniel M. Lacktman et al., Top 5 Telehealth Law Predictions for 2021, 11 NAT’L L.
REV. 12 (2020).
429 Introduction, INTERSTATE MEDICAL LICENSURE COMPACT (last visited Dec. 8,
2021), https://www.imlcc.org/a-faster-pathway-to-physician-licensure/; Eli Y.
Adashi, et. al., The Interstate Medical Licensure Compact: Attending to the Underserved, 325
J. AM. MED. ASS’N, 1607, 1607 (2021).
430 Compact State Map – Participating States, INTERSTATE MEDICAL LICENSURE
COMPACT, https://www.imlcc.org/participating-states/.
431 Nelson, supra note 390, at 1038. Additionally, only physicians belonging to the
American Board of Medical Specialties or the American Osteopathic Association’s
Bureau of Osteopathic Specialists are eligible for IMLC. Id.
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among states—states across the political spectrum—that cross-state
medical care should be promoted. As the shield laws and travel bans
explored in Part II illustrate, the Dobbs era will be one marked by
animosity between states rather than the cooperation that has
informed telehealth expansion and licensure compacts.
Nevertheless, among abortion-permissive states, license
compacts could improve interstate abortion provision, thus blunting
the effect of state laws and state borders. For instance, a pool of
providers across abortion-supportive states could better manage the
demand in those states. This pooling of resources would reduce
pressure on individual abortion providers, especially those in states
immediately abutting antiabortion states, who, as a result, will likely see
more patients traveling from antiabortion states. Thus, if Illinois
experiences an increase in patients due to its proximity to Kentucky,
providers in Maine with permission to practice in Illinois could offer
early abortions by telemedicine to those in the first ten weeks, freeing
Illinois-based providers to focus their attention on the procedural
abortions after ten weeks. Licensure compacts will also improve
flexibility. If an abortion provider in Kentucky is now unable to
perform abortions in Kentucky, she could register in other states
permitting telehealth for abortion and provide abortions to patients
scattered throughout abortion-supportive states, even if she remains in
Kentucky.432
The Uniform Law Commission is drafting a model act on
telehealth for states to adopt. The draft act creates a registration
process for out-of-state practitioners seeking to practice telehealth in a
patient’s resident state; registered out-of-state physicians would have
the same privileges as in-state physicians, as would physicians who are
subject to an interstate compact or who consult with a practitioner who
has “established a practitioner–patient relationship with the patient.”433
The scope of care is broadly defined under the draft act: “A
practitioner may provide a telehealth service to a patient located in this
state if to do so is consistent with the practitioner’s scope of practice
in this state, the applicable professional practice standard in this state,
and the requirements of federal law and law of this state.”434
One risk, however, would be if Kentucky passed a law or issued a policy
through its medical board that providing abortion services anywhere in the United
States could subject the provider with a Kentucky license to disciplinary action. We
discuss the ramifications of disciplinary actions for licensure and malpractice
insurance in Part II.D and below.
433 Uniform Law Commission, Telehealth Act, § 5(a) (Draft, Nov. 2021). In
addition, an out-of-state physician may provide “follow-up care to treatment
provided in the state in which the out-of-state practitioner is licensed, certified, or
otherwise authorized by law to provide the treatment; and the follow-up care is
infrequent or episodic and occurs not later than [one year] after the previously
provided in-person treatment.” Id. § 5(a)(4)(A)-(B).
434 Id. § 3(a).
432
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A few aspects of the ULC’s draft are noteworthy for the
coming questions about how states might regulate telehealth for
medication abortion by regulating telehealth services, licensure, and
professional discipline generally. First, the draft tracks the standard of
care in telehealth, which is to identify the controlling state law as the
law where the patient is. As Part II noted, Massachusetts enacted a
shield law that applies “regardless of the patient location”435 and some
jurisdictions, given the nature of medication abortion, are considering
defining care as where the provider is. If care is defined as occurring
where the provider was, at least in the abortion context, it would
change what law governs. There is a catch, however, under the model
act, which seeks to represent common practices and standards across
states. The act includes an exception for state-banned health care,
precluding “provision of a health care service otherwise prohibited by
federal law or the law of this state.”436 Taken on its face, this would
apply to abortion bans unless an exception for abortion was made or
the relevant care is defined by the location of the provider. (And a
further complication: Section 4 of the draft act forbids any law treating
telehealth differently than in-person care except for prescribing
controlled substances, thus a carve out for telehealth for abortion may
contradict the terms of Section 4.) In addition, the act could exclude
providers from interstate registration if they are subject to disciplinary
investigation in any state. Without clarification, there could be a
conflict with the shield laws discussed earlier, as passed by New York
and Connecticut, which seek to protect providers from in-state
repercussions of disciplinary actions taken in other states. There is a
similar conflict between shield laws and interstate licensure compacts
under the IMLC. Licensure compacts as enacted by states, like New
Jersey, require reciprocal recognition of disciplinary actions taken by
other compact states. In participating in an interstate licensure
compact, New Jersey pledges to recognize a disciplinary action taken
in Alabama, for example.437
The ULC’s model act spotlights the complexities inherent in
mapping abortion care onto policies that govern telehealth, licensure,
discipline across the board. Shield laws target some of those
complications, but a word of caution is worth repeating. Although
providers’ home state’s laws may seek to protect them from penalties
imposed by other states, shield laws may not be able to fully insulate
them from all negative consequences, especially when professional
discipline is involved. And any travel outside the state may be high risk.
For example, Kentucky courts could hear a civil suit and enter a default
See discussion supra Part II.D.
Id. § 3(b). A previous, now purposefully deleted, comment to this section listed
abortion restrictions as a relevant example. The comment stated: “a state might
prohibit the prescription of abortion-inducing medications or other controlled
substances through telehealth.” Id. Comment to Section 3.
437 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-6.2 (2022).
435
436
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judgment against a provider, though evidence would be difficult to
amass if no one agrees to cooperate. For the reasons we discuss in Part
II, pulling a non-resident provider into a state like Kentucky for
criminal prosecution could be difficult. But if that person travels to
Kentucky—even accidentally (e.g., their flight to California has an
emergency landing there)—Kentucky could easily arrest them.
Moreover, in the scenario where a provider has a default
judgment or disciplinary proceeding against them in another state,
three dilemmas arise. First, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, only
in some circumstances can a state can decide to ignore a judgment
entered against one of its residents in another state, even if that
resident never stepped foot in the other state, but that state
nonetheless established jurisdiction over the provider.438 Second,
providers’ home states may have little power to stop creditors from
attacking the assets of providers if unpaid money judgments from
other states are not satisfied.439 And, third, related to disciplinary
action, the medical boards in other states in which a provider has a
license but that do not have shield laws, assuming the home state has
attempted to shield the person from disciplinary charges, can take
account of legal sanctions anywhere in the country, with potential
effects for the provider’s good standing and malpractice insurance
costs in that other state. Thus, even if supported by their home state,
providers looking to engage in cross-border care would need to
consider restricting future travel to avoid criminal prosecution and
might still risk some civil and professional consequences.
Fourth and finally, the federal government could expand
access to medication abortion, and all abortion, by supporting
interstate travelers, removing unnecessary abortion restrictions that
create barriers to efficient care, and working to improve the rate and
efficiency of reimbursement for insurance coverage of abortion, both
private and public.440 Senators Elizabeth Warren and Patti Murray, in
a June 2022 letter, urged the Administration to secure material support
for care: “Federal agencies could explore opportunities to provide
vouchers for travel, child care services, and other forms of support for
individuals seeking to access abortion care that is unavailable in their
home state.”441 Because these measures do not fund abortion services,
See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
See Edward H. Cooper, Res Judicata Between State Courts, 18B Fed. Prac. &
Proc. Juris. 4467, n.14 (3d ed.).
440 David S. Cohen, Greer Donley, & Rachel Rebouché, States Want to Ban Abortions
Beyond Their Borders. Here’s What Pro-Choice States Can Do, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13,
2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/13/opinion/missouri-abortion-roe-vwade.html.
441 Letter to the President of the United States on Abortion Executive Orders, 2,
(June 7, 2022),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2022.06.07%20Letter%20to%20
POTUS%20on%20Abortion%20EO.pdf.
438
439
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they arguably fall outside of the Hyde Amendment’s reach. Other
resources, marshalled though federal agencies with varying powers and
expertise, could be used to attempt to soften the material consequences
for abortion patients after Dobbs.442 Any efforts to streamline care,
remove barriers, and increase the number of abortion providers will
help all patients.
The federal government, with state cooperation in some areas,
can improve access to medication abortion and telehealth for abortion;
doing so would have collateral effects in anti-abortion states, regardless
of their opposition. As early abortion access becomes more portable,
it will be easier to obtain for everyone. Patients who travel from antiabortion states to obtain an abortion at a brick-and-mortar clinic will
find providers with greater capacity. Others who cross state lines to
access abortion will have an easier time doing so because they can use
telemedicine just over the border or at a friend’s house instead of being
bound to the location of a clinic. In clinical spaces, facilities are
emerging at locations that ease travel, such as near airports or land
borders.443 And yet others who want to remain in antiabortion states
might find more options to explore, including mail forwarding and
“doctors of conscience,”444 if they are willing to take on the serious
legal risks those measures include. As a result, the interjurisdictional
conflicts described throughout this Article will intensify as
antiabortion states’ policies are thwarted by the efforts of the federal
government and abortion-supportive states.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have identified the seismic shifts in abortion
law and practice that are coming now that the Supreme Court has
abandoned Roe. The future will be one of interjurisdictional conflict, in
all the ways identified here (and in many ways yet to be considered).
But within these identified conflicts lies opportunities to untether
abortion access to the pronouncement of constitutional abortion
For example, the Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services could ensure, as a
condition of participation, that Hyde-compliant abortions are performed at
participating hospitals and other facilities in every state. Centers for Medicaid &
Medicare Services, Medicare Coverage Database, Abortion, Centers for Medicaid &
Medicare Services, https://www.cms.gov/medicare-coveragedatabase/view/ncd.aspx?NCDId=127&ncdver=2&bc=AAAAgA (“Abortions are
not covered Medicare procedures except: 1. If the pregnancy is the result of an act
of rape or incest; or 2. In the case where a woman suffers from a physical disorder,
physical injury, or physical illness, including a life-endangering physical condition
caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself, that would, as certified by a
physician, place the woman in danger of death unless an abortion is performed.”)
443 Abortion Clinics are Opening Near Airports and State Borders, TIME, June 9,
2022, https://time.com/6185519/abortion-clinics-travel-state-borders/.
444 CAROLE JOFFE, DOCTORS OF CONSCIENCE: THE STRUGGLE TO PROVIDE
ABORTION BEFORE AND AFTER ROE V. WADE (1996).
442
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rights. As discussed throughout this Article, these opportunities
include shielding abortion providers in abortion-supportive states
from out-of-state investigations, lawsuits, or prosecutions; preempting
state laws that contradict federal laws and regulations; providing
abortion services on federal land; further loosening federal restrictions
on medication abortion; and advancing telabortion through licensure
and telemedicine infrastructure.
There is no guarantee that all, or even any, of these strategies
will work, especially because some of them will rely on courts that
might be hostile to abortion rights, especially the current Supreme
Court; other options involve risks and collateral consequences that
people may not be willing to take.445 But thinking about
interjurisdictional approaches to abortion access is important now
more than ever because the abortion debate, and the conflicts it
inspires, are going to fundamentally change. For half a century, the
antiabortion movement has thrown whatever it can muster against the
wall, hoping something will stick and without fear of defeat. They have
lost many of their battles over the years, but have also had significant
victories. They have learned lessons, relied on lower court and
dissenting opinions, lobbied state legislators, influenced federal policy,
and continued to press their novel, often legally tenuous, approaches.
This steely-headed approach, coupled with the luck of Supreme Court
vacancies, has put them in the position to usher in a post-Roe era.
Without the protection of Roe, the abortion rights movement will be
forced to emulate at least some parts of this approach and press their
own novel strategies in the coming years446—strategies that will rely
less on respecting borders and more on infiltrating them on federal
land, preempting them with federal laws, or ignoring them altogether.
The coming interjurisdictional conflicts we have identified here
clarify the stakes for the future of abortion access. But in those
conflicts, there is also ample possibility for abortion advocates to
reimagine law, policy, and activism in a post-Roe country. These
coming battles will divide the nation and define this new abortion era
but may eventually lead to abortion laws and practices that are built to
last.

After all, if the Supreme Court is willing to overturn a half-century of precedent
in Dobbs, the Court also might refuse to apply any of the precedent or doctrine that
we discuss throughout this article, no matter how well established.
446 See generally David S. Cohen, Greer Donley, & Rachel Rebouché, Re-Thinking
Strategy After Roe, 75 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2022).
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